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Executive Summary 
 
This paper provides an overview of the voluminous literature relating tax and and the 
supply of effort that has developed since the Meade report on the UK tax system 30 
years ago, with a focus on presenting the empirical consensus on how taxes and benefits 
affect incentives.  
 
Our starting point is the traditional labour supply model, where hours of work and 
participation in work are the key measures of effort supplied by individuals. We discuss 
the way labour supply is modelled. We begin with a basic continuous hours model, where 
individuals have completely free choice over their hours of work. We then add important 
real-world features of the labour supply choice including fixed costs of labour-force 
participation, the complications introduced by the benefits system, dynamic aspects of 
labour supply and place the analysis in the context of the family. We discuss how what 
such models tell us about the effects of tax reform on work behaviour.  
 
We then discuss the “new Tax Responsiveness” literature which takes a more general 
view of effort and does not assume that it can be perfectly measured by hours of work 
supplied. Here the focus is on the response of taxable income to the marginal tax rate as 
a summary statistic of the behavioural response to taxation. Underlying this approach is 
the unsatisfactory nature of using hours as a proxy for labour effort for those with high 
levels of autonomy on the job and who already work long hours, such as the self 
employed or senior executives. The literature typically uses a difference-in-differences 
approach, comparing the taxable income of treatment and control groups, before and 
after a reform. This leads to several problems because of the confounding impact of 
temporary income shocks, secular trends in the income distribution and general 
equilibrium wage effects, and the direction of the bias is unknown. Efforts to control for 
these factors are important, but because the specifics of each tax reform are different, it 
is difficult to generalise from one reform, as can be seen by applying a consistent 
methodology across the full range of tax reforms in the 20
th century.  
 
Finally, we discuss the impact that taxes and benefits can have on longer run outcomes, 
which affect standards of living, such as education and training choices. Taking these 
effects into account should be a central consideration of any tax and benefit system. 
 
After discussing relevant theory we then provide a summary of the relevant empirical 
estimates and the methodology underlying the studies. We use this work to formulate our 
overall view of the responsiveness of labour supply and place by far the greatest weight 
on work that avoids making overly strong assumptions, but that nevertheless has a 
structural interpretation in order to make it generalisable. It is important to study the 
right margin when analysing labour supply, and the paper considers hours, participation 
and taxable income.  
Our conclusion is that hours of work are relatively inelastic for men, but are a little more 
responsive for married women and lone mothers. On the other hand, participation is 
quite sensitive to taxation and benefits for women. Within this paper we present new 
estimates form a discrete participation model for both married and single men based on 
the numerous reforms over the past two decades in the UK. We find that the 
participation of low education men is somewhat more responsive to incentives than 
previously thought. For men with high levels of education, participation is virtually 
unresponsive; here the literature on taxable income suggests that there may be significant 
welfare costs of taxation, although much of this seems to be a result of shifting income 
and consumption to non-taxable forms as opposed to actual reductions in work effort. Labour Supply and Taxes∗
Costas Meghir† , David Phillips‡
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Abstract
In this paper we provide an overview of the literature relating labour supply to taxes and welfare
beneﬁts with a focus on presenting the empirical consensus. We begin with a basic continuous hours
model, where individuals have completely free choice over their hours of work. We then consider ﬁxed
costs of work, the complications introduced by the beneﬁts system, dynamic aspects of labour supply
and we place the analysis in the context of the family. The key conclusion of this work is that in
order to estimate the impact of tax reform and be able to generalise results, a structural approach
that takes account of many of these issues is desirable. We then discuss the “new Tax Responsiveness”
literature which uses the response of taxable income to the marginal tax rate as a summary statistic of the
behavioural response to taxation. Underlying this approach is the unsatisfactory nature of using hours
as a proxy for labour eﬀo r tf o rt h o s ew i t hh i g hl e v e l so fa u t o n o m yo nt h ej o ba n dw h oa l r e a d yw o r kl o n g
hours, such as the self employed or senior executives. After discussing relevant theory we then provide
a summary of empirical estimates and the methodology underlying the studies. Our conclusion is that
hours of work are relatively inelastic for men, but are a little more responsive for married women and lone
mothers. On the other hand, participation is quite sensitive to taxation and beneﬁts for women. Within
this paper we present new estimates form a discrete participation model for both married and single men
based on the numerous reforms over the past two decades in the UK. We ﬁnd that the participation of
low education men is somewhat more responsive to incentives than previously thought. For men with
high levels of education, participation is virtually unresponsive; here the literature on taxable income
suggests that there may be signiﬁcant welfare costs of taxation, although much of this seems to be a
result of shifting income and consumption to non-taxable forms as opposed to actual reductions in work
eﬀort.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Since the original Meade (1978) report1 and indeed for sometime before then, there has been an intensive
research programme focussed on the way labour supply responds to incentives.2 The impact of taxation on
work eﬀort is one of the main sources of ineﬃciency of a distortionary tax system. The magnitude of the
ineﬃciency depends on how eﬀort reacts to incentives as well as how the tax and transfer system changes the
incentives to work and earn. More broadly, if one is to design a tax and beneﬁt system with some element
of optimality one needs to know how individuals react to taxes and beneﬁts. This implies knowledge of how
sensitive eﬀo r ti st oi n c e n t i v e sa td i ﬀerent education groups and for both men and women. This chapter
reviews the main issues that have arisen in this voluminous research agenda and oﬀers what we view are the
central empirical conclusions about the impact of incentives on the supply of eﬀort.
In the ﬁrst part of the chapter we describe the modelling approaches to labour supply, and we discuss
the main implications of these theoretical contributions. We explain how these are relevant to modelling and
understanding the incentive eﬀects of taxation and welfare beneﬁts and demonstrate that policy analysis
requires one to consider the incentives implied by the entire tax and beneﬁt system as an integrated whole.
The key issue is how eﬀort reacts to incentives. However, eﬀort can be adjusted on many diﬀerent
margins: people can change their hours of work per week or per year, whether they work at all or not3
and the amount of eﬀort they put into working. Some may also be able to change the way earn income
(salary, dividends, capital gains) or how they consume so as to change the tax liability. For many people
hours worked is quite a good approximation to eﬀort and the study of the incentive eﬀe c t so ft a x a t i o ni sa
study of how hours worked are aﬀected by taxes and transfers. However, for some higher skill individuals
in particular, hours worked is not a good measure of eﬀort. They can adjust eﬀort by working harder at
ideas and being more creative within a particular time period. In addition, given the way the tax systems
are designed, taxation may provide an incentive to over-consume items that are tax-deductible or to shift
earnings to tax-favoured forms. Thus the tax incentives of the wealthy have other dimensions than hours
of work and these can be an important source of distortions in the tax system. We explain the empirical
issues relating to estimating the incentive eﬀects on the various margins of labour/eﬀort supply providing a
critical review of the various empirical approaches.
1Meade (1978)
2Heckman (1974), Burtless and Hausman (1978) Hausman (1985),Mroz (1987), MaCurdy,Green and Paarsch (1990), Blundell
and Walker (1986), Blundell, Meghir, Symons and Walker (1988), Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1998) to mention but a few.
3We refer to this as participation or labour force participation. The way we use the term should not be confused with
whether someone is in the labour force (searching for work or working). For us a participant is someone actually in work.
2In the second part of the paper we review empirical results and oﬀer a uniﬁed view of the consensus that
has emerged. We base our description on elasticities, which reﬂect the sensitivity of labour supply to small
changes in incentives. These measures are not necessarily suﬃcient for understanding the impact of reforms
(as we explain in the paper) but they do oﬀer a way of providing coherent comparisons across models.4
The review of the literature yields a very interesting picture. Incentives certainly matter, but the relevant
margin diﬀers by demographic and education group. For some groups such as women with young children
taxes and beneﬁts can aﬀect whether to work or not as well as how many hours they work. For low education
men tax and beneﬁt incentives are also important, but only for the participation decision; their hours of work
are insensitive to changes in taxes and beneﬁts. These men either do not work at all (and up to 25% do not)
or work full time — this margin is quite sensitive to how the tax and beneﬁt system is structured. Among
full time workers there is quite a dispersion of hours worked, but taxes and beneﬁts have never been able to
explain this eﬀectively. For highly educated and wealthy men, taxes do not aﬀect whether they work or not
and how many hours they put in a week or even a year. They do however aﬀect their total as well as their
taxable income; they respond both by reorganising their aﬀairs to beneﬁtf o r mt h ew a yd i ﬀerent sources of
income are taxed and by shifting consumption to deductible sources. They can also adjust the amount of
eﬀort they put into their work. Empirical approaches diﬀer and data sets diﬀer; however we believe there is
a broad consensus in these issues, if not at the detail and at the precise numbers, deﬁnitely for the overall
picture.
1.1 Taxes, Beneﬁts and Labour Supply.
We start by considering the basic labour supply model which is at the heart of the large literature on the
incentive eﬀect of taxation. Labour supply models express the trade oﬀ between market work and leisure.5
Under suitable conditions on preferences, the labour supply function depends on a measure of non-labour
(or “unearned”) income denoted by µ and the marginal wage rate w,which represents the amount earned in
real terms for an extra hour of work. Non-labour income may include any source of income that is unrelated
to the work decision of the person in question. Thus it cannot include means-tested transfers, but it can
include universal beneﬁts such as the UK’s child beneﬁt. Labour supply can also depend on a collection
4An elasticity of hours of work with respect to the wage, say, is the proportional change in hours of work caused by a
proportional change in the wage. So an elasticity of 1 means that a 10% increase in the wage will lead to a 10% increase in
hours. So suppose for the sake of argument that someone is facing a 20% tax rate and that his wage elasticity is 0.5. Suppose
the tax rate is raised to 22%. This represents a 2.5% reduction in the after tax wage; with the 0.5 elasticity, this would imply
a 1.25% reduction in hours worked. In Appendix 1 we deﬁne several terms that we will use many times throughout our paper.
5A a better and more accurate term for leisure might be non-market time. However we use these terms interchangeably.
3of background and family characteristics which aﬀect one’s tastes for work and which we we summarise as
Z.T h u st h eZ variables can include the number and ages of children, education level etc. The relationship
expressed is just a reﬂection of the way individuals are willing to trade oﬀ leisure for pay at a given period
of time. Now we need to see how the eﬀects of taxes are incorporated within this framework. We will then
discuss the role of ﬁxed costs of work and dynamics or intertemporal trade-oﬀs, making the framework richer
for policy analysis.6
1.1.1 Progressive taxes and tax reform with continuous hours of work
T a x e sa n dm e a n st e s t e dt r a n s f e r sa ﬀect the returns to work, often in complicated ways. A key purpose of
a labour supply model is to provide a framework for understanding and measuring the way that tax and
welfare systems aﬀect incentives. In the simplest possible propor t i o n a lt a xs y s t e m ,t h em a r g i n a lt a xr a t ei s
a constant; in most cases this will lead to less work, but when the income eﬀect dominates the substitution
eﬀect at high hours of work it may increase eﬀort. From an empirical/econometric point of view, ignoring
taxes will lead to biased estimates of labour supply eﬀects because we will have miss-measured the returns to
work; from a policy point of view we will have no framework for understanding how taxes aﬀect behaviour.
However, suppose instead that individuals face a tax on earnings (E) of the following form: no tax is
paid up until earnings A1, earnings between A1 and A2 are taxed at a rate of τ1, earnings above A2 but
below A3 are taxed at a rate τ2 and earnings above A3 are taxed at a rate τ3 (and perhaps there are further
tax brackets). With this structure and with the tax rates increasing we say that the budget set is convex.7
Figure 1 shows how pre and post tax earnings relate under this standard tax system.
In this special case the labour supply decision can be expressed as if the tax system was proportional
(not progressive) with the applicable tax rate being the actual marginal tax rate that the individual faces
(τ1,τ 2, τ3 etc.) and a suitably adjusted non-labour income, which we call mk(µ) where k denotes the tax
bracket to which the person belongs. The value this adjusted non-labour income depends on all the tax rates
up until the one facing the individual as well as on the thresholds (A1,A 2 etc.). Thus if the individual is
facing a zero marginal tax rate she behaves as if is relevant non-labour income is m0(µ)=µ. If she is facing
tax rate τ1 she behaves as if her non labour income is m1(µ)=µ + τ1A1; if she is facing tax rate τ2 her
adjusted non-labour income is m2(µ)=µ + τ1A1 +( τ2 − τ1)A2. Thus behaviour along the convex budget
6A comprehensive analysis of the issues relating to estimating labour supply models with taxes can be found in Blunell,
MaCurdy and Meghir (2007).
7There is a simple test of whether a budget set is convex or not. Take any two feasible hours income combinations and join
them with a line; if all points on the joining line are also attainable then the budget set is convex. Otherwise it is non-convex
and the underlying tax system is not progressive everywhere.
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5set (progressive tax system) can be characterised by increasing marginal rates and increasing non-labour
income. 8 As we explain below this structure of the tax system implies that changing marginal tax rates
has stronger impacts than they would in a simple proportional tax system.
Box 1.
Modelling labour Supply with convex budget sets - a technical digression
More formally, suppose the hours of work someone is willing to supply can be written
as h(w,µ | Z) with w being the marginal wage for an extra hour of work and µ non-labour
income. The form of h and its sensitivity to w and µ depends on individual preferences,
partly explained by Z. With progressive taxation, i.e. when the budget set is convex (as
deﬁned in the main text) labour supply can be shown to depend only on the marginal
wage at the tax bracket where she is positioned and on the special measure of non-labour
income, as described in the main text, which we denote by mk(µ). Thus we can write
h = h((1 − τk)w,mk(µ)|Z), where the relevant tax rate τk is the one at the optimal point
of labour supply; w(1−τk) is the slope of the budget constraint at that point. The relevant
non-labour income mk(µ) depends on the entire set of marginal tax rates and allowances
up until and including the tax bracket k in which the individual is positioned as shown in
the main text .
The behaviour of one group of individuals is not described by the approach above: These
are individuals who chose hours of work exactly on the kink where the marginal tax rate
changes. The reason this happens is because these individuals wish to work more than the
tax threshold when facing the lower tax rate and less than the tax threshold when facing
the higher tax rate; the only feasible point is then the king. In principle there is a mass of
individuals at these points and they cannot be ignored when carrying out policy analysis.
In practice, individuals are rarely found on such convex kinks, but the reason for this is not
clear; it may be because people make small errors, or they cannot ﬁnd precisely the job they
wish, or perhaps we measure their hours with error.
Within this simple framework there are a number of econometric and policy issues to deal with. We will
discuss the econometric issues later. Now we take the labour supply function as known, which is akin to
saying that we know preferences (i.e. the utility function) and consider the implications for policy analysis.
In particular take a decrease in the marginal tax rate at diﬀerent points in the system. We can distinguish
the following simple cases:9
• The tax rate being changed relates to earnings higher than those earned by the individual. In this case
the tax rate change has no impact on her optimal hours of work. See Figure 2.
• The tax rate being changed is precisely the one faced by the individual. In this case the eﬀect on labour
supply comes about because both the marginal wage and the eﬀective non-labour income changes: the
8Individuals may not always end up at the part of the tax schedule they planned to be. So the observed tax position may
not be the desired one. The implication of this measurement or missclassiﬁcation error, originally discussed by Burtless and
Hausman (1978) is not discussed in this paper.
9In this discussion we will abstract from the possibility that income eﬀects dominate and counteract substitution eﬀects,
leading to negative eﬀects of wages on hours of work. Empirically this has not proved to be an important issue.
6decrease in the tax rate increases the slope of the budget constraint (the incentive eﬀect of the wage
rate) and reduces its intercept, as if the individual had less non-labour income. Hence, the eﬀects of
reduction in taxation above the non-taxable allowance in the context of a nonlinear tax system can be
understood as having the combined eﬀect of increasing the after tax wage rate and taking away some
of the persons "non-labour" income. Now suppose that increasing the after tax wage increases hours
of work10.T h ee ﬀect of the tax decrease is going to be reinforced by the virtual decline in non-labour
income which acts to encourage work. Figure 3 shows this. Thus it seems that a tax rate reduction
above a threshold has a larger impact than the same tax rate reduction if it is applied to all income (for
the same person). The intuition for this is as follows: the reduction in taxes causes a substitution in
favour of work, because of improved incentives. It also leads to an increase in overall resources leading
to a tendency to reduce work. However, a reduction in the tax rate that applies above a certain point
only, involves a smaller rise in net earnings than if that tax rate applied to all income. Hence, the
magnitude of the income eﬀect that counteracts the substitution eﬀect will be smaller than in the case
of a simple proportional tax. The tax cut would therefore imply a larger rise in labour supply than if
the reduction in the tax rate applied to all income.
• The tax rate being changed corresponds to a lower income bracket than the one in which our individual
is positioned. In this case there is only an income eﬀect - individuals receive a windfall increase in
net earnings but without a change of in their marginal wage. In this case an increase in the tax rate
unambiguously decreases labour supply if leisure is a normal good.
• Changes in the thresholds of taxation (Ak) will have pure income eﬀects for individuals earning above
that threshold, but whose marginal tax rate remains unchanged. However, for some individuals the
change in thresholds will lead to changes in the tax rates faced and the eﬀect on Labour supply will
again be ambiguous, but will be more likely to involve an increase in labour supply than under a simple
proportional tax system.
Thus, even in this simple framework it becomes apparent that the policy implications of tax reform
cannot easily be summarised by one elasticity. In the simple world of a tax system with increasing marginal
tax rates the implications of tax reform will depend on both income eﬀects and wage eﬀe c t s ,a sw e l la so n
10This means that the standard substitution eﬀect of improved incentives (that make one wish to work more) dominates the
standard income eﬀect of increased net earnings (which would make one want to work less provided leisure is a normal good
i.e. one that you consume more as income rises).
7the way individuals are distributed over the entire budget constraint.
In Figures 2-4 we show what happens to optimal hours of work when the tax rate changes. In these
graphs the straight lines show how after tax income changes when hours increase and thus in work income
increases. This part is just as in 1, except that the horizontal axis depicts hours of work instead of pre-tax
earnings and we have shifted the graph upwards by the amount of non-labour income µ.Thus, as hours (and
hence pre-tax earnings) increase take home pay increases. When the individual earns above the tax exempt
threshold the gradient of the budget line declines by the amount implied by the tax rate in force. The curved
lines are the indiﬀerence curves and represent the rate at which the individual needs to be compensated
to accept to work more. These curves underlie the labour supply functions we estimate from the data. In
Figure 2 a tax rate is changed for individuals earning more than our worker. She has no incentive to change
her work-plans. In Figure 3 the tax rate is decreased above the allowance A from ta to tb. In eﬀect this can
be interpreted as an increase in the marginal wage (the return to an extra hour of work) from w(1 − ta) to
w(1 − tb) and a decline in non-labour income from µ + A × ta to µ + A × tb. Given the current empirical
results this will lead to an increase in hours of work. Finally in Figure 4 (case C) a tax rate is reduced for
individuals earning less than our worker. For our worker this is as if non-labour income increased and the
marginal return to work remain unchanged. The implication will be a reduction in hours of work for our
worker. Thus the same type of reform (a decrease in the tax rate in one of the tax brackets) will have very
diﬀerent eﬀects for individuals at diﬀerent parts of the tax system. The ﬁnal outcome will depend on how
sensitive labour supply is to changes in the marginal return to work and in non-labour income as well as
how individuals are distributed over the budget set.
1.1.2 Allowing for welfare beneﬁts
The UK has a complex system of welfare beneﬁts and tax credits, mostly means-tested, resulting in po-
tentially large transfers to individuals. Their aim is to provide a safety net against poverty and sometimes
to provide work incentives at the same time, such as the Working tax credit programme in the UK (and
the Earned Income Tax Credit in the US). At the margin, welfare beneﬁts may act as taxes on individuals,
because in many cases the levels of entitlement vary with earnings or income; whilst this serves to limit
the eligible population to a targeted group it also implies a marginal tax rate on earnings as beneﬁts are
withdrawn. Suppose an individual receives a means-tested transfer. When earnings increase, some of the
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Figure 4:
income tax they pay. In some cases welfare beneﬁts are associated with a subsidy over a range of earnings.
This is the case of the US tax credit scheme, where an increase in earnings is associated with an increase in
the beneﬁt for very low earnings. In the UK tax credits oﬀer a maximum beneﬁt for those working above 16
hours of work with a means tested amount tapered at 39% for each extra pound earned. Thus understanding
the eﬀect of means-testing is equivalent to understanding how welfare beneﬁts change the budget constraint
and how changes to the latter aﬀect labour supply behaviour.
The UK (as well as the US) system leads to a non-convex budget set as demonstrated in ﬁgure 5.11 The
jump up represents eligibility for the tax credit at 16 hours. The magnitude of the jump reﬂects the amount
of the beneﬁt. The gradient following that point reﬂects the taper rate. The budget constraint becomes
steeper when all the beneﬁt has been withdrawn and earnings increase at the rate of the actual hourly wage
rate.
On the same ﬁgure we also show how a change in the taper rate form 39% to say 29%, say, may aﬀect an
individual originally in the system and receiving tax credits (continuous curve) and an individual originally
11The nature of the US system is completely diﬀerent and has no condition attached to hours of work. The nonconvexity
arises there only at thepoint where all the beneﬁt has been withdrawn through the taper and earnings start increasing at a rate
equal to the wage rate.
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11earning too much to obtain tax credits (dotted curve). The budget set changes in the direction of the arrows
to the dashed line. The person originally receiving the tax credit now has an incentive to increase hours
of work from ha to hb, very much like the case where the tax rate is reduced. The person originally not
receiving tax credits now ﬁnds it preferable to reduce hours of work from hA to hB and enjoy the increased
entitlement of the reformed system. Thus, when budget sets are not convex it is quite possible that relatively
small changes to beneﬁts, tax credits or taxes leads to large changes in hours worked (e.g. from hA to hB).
Thus the non-convexities in the budget set invalidate our ability to carry out marginal analysis of tax
and beneﬁt reforms based simply on the elasticity, or local sensitivity of hours to a small change in work
incentives.
1.2 Family labour supply, taxes and programme participation
We now turn to describing an approach for modelling family labour supply and the take up of welfare
beneﬁts. This approaches addresses the complexities that arise in trying to model the incentive eﬀects of
taxation and welfare in a two person household and oﬀer an insight in how models can simulate policy in
this context.
Observing the distribution of weekly hours one gets the impression that hours of work are discrete with
a number of focal points where people bunch together. While we are not able to explain why people bunch
at certain points, the discrete labour supply approach at least allows us to recognise the existence of the
phenomenon. And it is certainly convenient because we can use the apparatus of the so called discrete choice
literature where the individual chooses among a number of speciﬁc alternatives. In this case each choice is
a packet of hours for each household member and the resulting income.
Based on this idea, we outline a model of labour supply for a couple . Our model is going to be of the
unitary type, i.e. where there is a single household utility function and we ignore the issues relating to
intrahousehold allocations of income. However, we will also address one important policy concern, namely
the take-up of means tested beneﬁts; while taxation is compulsory, taking up beneﬁts is usually not, making
the entire shape of the budget constraint that an individual is facing a choice of the individual: individuals
w h od on o tt a k eu pab e n e ﬁt, will not face the same budget constraint as those who do. Understanding the
determinants of take-up is important for properly targeting beneﬁts and for budgetary planning.
Suppose individuals derive satisfaction (utility) from leisure, disposable income and programme partic-
ipation P; the latter entails dissatisfaction because the process of applying for beneﬁts and receiving them
12may carry stigma or other indirect/psychic costs. By allowing for this in the model we are able to model
the decision to take up beneﬁts and how this will depend on programme characteristics. It thus oﬀers a
mechanism for simulating tax reform, allowing for the eﬀects on take up.12
The budget constraint deﬁnes household disposable income Y depending on the combination of hours
c h o s e nb yt h em a l ea n dt h ef e m a l ea n do nt h et a xa n db e n e ﬁt system and its take-up. The budget constraint
m a ya l s od e p e n do nh o u s e h o l dc h a r a c t e r i s t i c ss u c ha st h en u m b e ra n da g e so fc h i l d r e na n dt h et y p eo f
housing occupied, because of the way the tax and beneﬁtc o d ei sd e ﬁned.
Now simplify the problem by assuming that individuals can work certain speciﬁc hours of work, say
(0,h 1,h 2,...,hk) where 0 allows for non-work, and suppose for illustrative purposes that there is just one
means tested programme. Given a particular pair of hourly wage rates for the woman and her partner there
are then (k +1 ) 2 possible values of income Y with welfare programme participation and another (k +1 ) 2
without (although some of the income points would overlap because not all hour/income combinations would
be aﬀected by the programme) The household chooses hours of work and programme participation by trading
oﬀ income against the disutility of eﬀort (hours of work) and monetary or psychological costs of programme
participation; in other words it chooses the combination that maximises utility.
Apparently identical households facing identical options often make diﬀerent decisions. As a result there
is some chance (probability) of observing any feasible hours/income/programme participation combination
for any individual with certain observable characteristics. The typical way that this is accounted for in
empirical economic models is to allow for preferences to vary randomly in the population. The econometric
problem of measuring preferences and stigma costs consists of choosing the parameters that will make the
probabilities predicted by the model equal (or as close as possible) to frequencies of hours/income/programme
participation combinations we see in the data. From an empirical point of view, identiﬁcation (i.e. the
ability to recover the actual parameters of the model) will depend on the existence of variations in the
budget constraint and in the costs of programme participation, shifting the opportunities available to the
households in a way that is unrelated to the unobserved taste components in the data. It is increasingly
popular to use the diﬀerential impact of policy reforms across the population as such a source of variation.
To simulate alternative policy options we need to predict what the probabilities of each alternative
hours/programme participation combination will be with the new tax parameters. Now that once we have
12see Keane and Moﬃtt (1998).
13parameter estimates, this involves recomputing the 2(k+1)2 income possibilities and ﬁnding the best combi-
nation for each type of household. We then need to aggregate these outcomes using as weights the frequency
with which each type occurs in the population. These weights and the types of household are themselves
an outcome of the estimation process mentioned above. This illustrates that the information required to
understand the impact of tax reform is quite complex. Experience from observing what happened around
one reform will typically not be useful for predicting the eﬀects of another. We really need to understand
the entire structure of preferences for work over a broad range of hours and incomes.
One of the key issues in family labour supply is understanding how intrahousehold allocations of time and
consumption actually take place. The models used typically, including the one described above, work on the
basis that the household is a unit with well deﬁned preferences (hence the term unitary model). But this is
brushes the issue under the carpet and more importantly does not allow us to understand how policies aﬀect
within household allocations. Indeed, one of the sources of inequality is within household and one would
wish to know how policies target individual members. Beyond the couple the issue extends to resource
allocations for children. Tax and welfare policy may well be designed with the aim of targeting children.
But without knowing how diﬀerent tax and beneﬁts t r u c t u r e sa ﬀect resource allocations it is not possible
to know whether the policies are going to be eﬀective. The empirical issue relates to the fact that we do
not typically observe allocations of consumption within a household; we just observe total expenditures. So
one needs to understand how much we can learn about intrahousehold allocations based on what is actually
observed or at least observable with better data. Chiappori (1988, 1992) explored the possibilities using
the Collective model, which assumes that whatever outcomes are observed are eﬃcient; in other words any
change in allocations would have to imply that improving one member’s position can only be achieved at
the expense of the other. In this context Chiappori (1988, 1992), followed by Blundell, Chiappori, Magnac
and Meghir (2007) derived conditions under which observing individual labour supply and total household
consumption would reveal the entire intrahousehold decision mechanism. Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir
(2005) extended this framework to one where the household spends on public goods (such as children).13
Once the mechanism has been estimated one can ask questions relating to how taxes and beneﬁts aﬀect
not only labour supply but also consumption of children and within household inequality. This literature
is currently better developed theoretically than empirically. Blundell et al. (2007) do provide possibly the
13There has been a growing literature in this ﬁeld The papers of Thomas (1990) and Browning et al (1996) showed the
empirical relevance of considering the household as a group of individuals, rather than one unit.
14only structural model of labour supply in a collective model. However, their households do not include
children. Moreover, they have not allowed for taxes and beneﬁts. This is very much an active and important
research area, that needs further development before we can be conﬁdent that we understand intrahousehold
allocations and how they interact with policy.
1.3 Intertemporal Labour Supply decisions and Taxes
1.3.1 Continuous hours of work
The majority of work that has taken place in labour supply and taxes has been static. Introducing dynamics
poses a number of interesting questions and allows us to extend the scope of the analysis of the impact of
taxes on other important life-cycle decisions. Moreover, if we are to address the question of optimality of
tax systems over time, we need to study how labour supply varies over the life-cycle and how this is aﬀected
by tax incentives and this involves considering people’s saving decisions as well. Here our aim is, of course,
much more circumscribed: we wish to discuss some of the empirical issues that arise when we view labour
supply decisions in an intertemporal context.
What does the basic labour supply model look like when we allow for savings? To consider this, suppose
preferences are separable over time, meaning that past choices do not aﬀect current preferences or the budget
constraint, and that within each period preferences just depend on current consumption and hours of work.
Then the labour supply model takes exactly the same form as in the static case with an important diﬀerence
in the interpretation of non labour income µ.14 This is now deﬁned by µ = c − wh where c is the value
of consumption in the current period, which itself is a result of an intertemporal optimisation problem.
The problem can be described by the following two stage budgeting procedure ﬁrst discussed by Gorman
(1959). Individuals ﬁrst allocate consumption to a particular time period and given this choice, they then
decide what should be the optimal hours of work.15 Adding taxation when the budget set is convex is in
principle simple and the labour supply model does not change in form from the one described earlier. In
other words we simply replace the wage with the appropriate after tax wage rate and unearned income for
the tax adjusted one, starting with µ deﬁned above as the basis. Although the form of the relationship does
not change, in that labour supply can still be expressed as depending from the marginal wage and some
measure of non-labour income, substantively, things do change because consumption, which determines the
relevant measure of non-labour income, will now depend on current taxes and future expectations of the tax
14See MaCurdy (1983), Blundell and Walker(1986), Arellano and Meghir (1992).
15More precisely the ﬁrst stage takes place in the knowledge that the second stage will be optimal. There are a number
conditions under which optimal consumer decisions can be thus broken down, but this is beyond the scope of this chapter.
15system.
Thus the simplicity of the problem stops in form and empirical characterisation. First a change in any
aspect of the tax system will aﬀect the optimal amount of saving, in general. This means that simulating a
tax reform with a ﬁxed µ will be insuﬃcient for evaluating the behavioural impact of a reform. The change
in the saving decision will reﬂect possible shifts in labour supply to future periods where tax liabilities are
expected to be lower. For example, suppose the higher rate of tax is to be increased, and that one’s wage
rate is expected to decline with age. An increase in the current tax rate will make the diﬀerence between
the current and the future after tax wage rate lower, implying that work eﬀort now could decrease relative
to the future, if we ignore income eﬀects at least. In this simple model this will be reﬂected as an increase
in the current value of µ induced by an decision to increase current consumption (remember µ = c − wh)
and a consequent decline in hours worked, over and above what would be implied by the static model. This
also implies that to estimate the incentive eﬀects of reforms in a reliable way we need to use consumption
data to compute µ and estimate a model consistent with intertemporal optimisation.
In the case of convex budget sets the diﬃculties caused by intertemporal considerations are conﬁned
to simulation. The labour supply model can be estimated in a straightforward way, by using the suitable
deﬁnition of µ,a sd e ﬁned above. However the situation is not as simple when the budget set is non-convex.
In this case estimation as well as the evaluation of tax reform require simulating the impact of taxation on
savings and hence µ.16
These issues may be very important for understanding labour supply eﬀects. However, to our knowledge
little or no work has been done in this direction, at least from the perspective of simulating tax reforms.
Apart from the computational diﬃculties involved, the requirements for high quality data (particularly
assets) has been an inhibiting factor in estimating complex intertemporal models that allow for the complete
structure of the tax system.17 An exception is the work of French (2005) who estimates a life-cycle model
of labour supply, savings and retirement, accounting for key aspects of the US tax code including important
non-convexities.
16In order to evaluate the likelihood function we need to compare the utility achieved at diﬀerent parts of the budget
constraint. This involves solving the labour supply model in counterfactual situations, such as not-working.
17It is possible to simplify the problem by eﬀectively ignoring savings and either assuming that consumption equals income
or by assuming that individual utilities depend linearly in income. In this case individuals do not care when the income will
arise. However, once taxes are introduced, which depend very much on when income arises, the simplicity provided by this last
assumption is partly lost.
16Which is the correct elasticity concept? Often labour supply sensitivity to incentives is summarised
by elasticities. Indeed below we use them to summarise empirical results. However, there are several wage
elasticity concepts, depending on what is being kept constant. In a static labour supply context we can
deﬁne the wage elasticity that keeps utility constant (the substitution eﬀect or compensated wage elasticity),
the wage elasticity that keeps non-labour income constant and the one that keeps full income constant
(total potential earnings plus non-labour income). Once we introduce intertemporal concerns there are a
number of additional elasticities we could consider as well as modiﬁcations of the concepts already deﬁned.
In an intertemporal context, the direct analogy to the static wage elasticity, which holds constant non-
labour income, is the one that keeps consumption based unearned income (µ) constant. Although useful for
characterising the properties of the estimated labour supply function, this is clearly not the correct measure
for understanding the eﬀects of policy, when adjustments to savings are to be expected.
We can straightforwardly deﬁne at least three additional elasticity concepts in the intertemporal context,
each with a diﬀerent interpretation. First, we have a notion of compensated wage elasticity. However, in an
intertemporal context this does not keep lifecycle welfare constant but only within period utility constant.
Hence it does not have a direct welfare interpretation ast h eo n ew eg e ti nt h es t a t i cc o n t e x t .N e v e r t h e l e s s
this elasticity is always positive. One can in principle deﬁne a lifetime utility constant elasticity, but this is
not usually done. Second, we have the Frisch elasticity, which keeps the marginal utility of wealth constant.
This elasticity reﬂects the impact of anticipated marginal changes in wages on hours of work. Thus it reﬂects
how people plan to allocate their work eﬀort between diﬀerent periods of the life-cycle, depending on the
return to work at each point. As such it is clearly not the elasticity of interest when considering changes
in tax policy: considering the eﬀects of tax policy would require to compare two alternative tax regimes.
However, this elasticity is an upper bound to the wage elasticity which keeps within period unearned income
(µ) constant. Finally we can also deﬁne an hours elasticity with respect to an unanticipated change in wages.
This will combine the eﬀects of an anticipated change and the wealth eﬀect of the change in the wage proﬁle.
Quite clearly, the magnitude of the eﬀect will depend on whether the change in wages is perceived to be
permanent and if not on the speed with which wages will revert to the original proﬁle. This is probably the
closest elasticity for understanding the overall eﬀects of a tax changed perceived to be permanent.
Generally, to understand how labour supply will change as a result of a permanent tax reform, we need
to understand ow savings will change as well as how sensitive labour supply is given savings.
171.3.2 Taxes and Human Capital
Taxes and welfare beneﬁts aﬀect more than labour supply. Of course, this is well understood and it may be
thought that in addressing this issue we are going beyond the scope of this chapter. However, the reason
we wish to consider this issue now is because these decisions are intimately linked with labour supply and
labour market behaviour more generally. In particular we have in mind choices relating to education and
human capital investment.
Appropriate models along these lines should include decisions on education, and labour supply as well
as wage formation. The seminal paper addressing the latter two is Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) who model
employment and wages of women when wages depend on experience. Since then these models have been
developed to greater levels of sophistication including other decision margins, such as occupational choice as
in Keane and Wolpin (1997) and education and job mobility as in Adda et al. (2006). We use the latter as
an illustration of some of the issues involved.
Adda et al. (2006) focus on the population who, having completed formal schooling, face the choice
of following formal vocational training or entering directly the labor market.18 At the start individuals
choose whether they will join a formal vocational training programme, which oﬀers on the job and classroom
training at a reduced wage, or no formal training. In taking this decision they trade-oﬀ current earnings
of a non-apprentice with working at a lower wage, while obtaining formal training and then obtaining an
improved career path. Alternatively they enter the job market and obtain training informally on-the-job.
Once the education choice has been made the individual starts up on his career, whether qualiﬁed through
training or directly without a formal training component. All individuals receive job oﬀers at some rate,
which may diﬀer depending on whether the worker is employed or not. Associated with an oﬀer are fringe
beneﬁts and a wage which deﬁnes the initial pay level in a ﬁrm given the person’s skills and experience as
well as how well they ﬁti nt h eﬁrm. While the worker remains on the job pay may evolve due to random
unaccounted factors. When out of work the individual has a stream of transfer income depending on the
way unemployment insurance works. Individual choices include moving between jobs when the opportunity
arises and between work and unemployment as well as the initial education choice.
This model, estimated on long run administrative data following individuals from the end of their school-
ing to mid-career, oﬀers an empirical framework for considering the impact of taxes on life-cycle decisions:
18Utility is linear in earnings making risk and the timing of consumption irrelevant for decision making, thus bypassing the
need to model savings.
18a tax or beneﬁtm a ya ﬀect the decision to train, because future returns are changed. It could aﬀect job
mobility, because the beneﬁts from moving job are in eﬀect taxable. Finally, it can also aﬀect the incentive
to work in any given period. But more interestingly, the overall employment eﬀect will be diﬀerent when
we allow for the other eﬀects, than when we condition on education and do not consider job mobility. This
allows for a clear distinction between short run eﬀects of taxes and beneﬁts and long run ones, which can
be very diﬀerent. The latter certainly need a complex intertemporal model to analyse and cannot be mea-
sured based on simple experiments or by static labour supply studies. The empirical work mentioned above
demonstrates that this can be an important issue.
1.4 Taxable and total income elasticities
For many individuals, particularly the self-employed and the high earners, hours of work is just one dimension
of work eﬀort. Take for example the executive who spends most of the week in the oﬃce and takes work
home at the weekend. She does not have much margin of adjustment for her hours of work. However, with
the right incentives, she may put in more thinking eﬀort during these long hours, surf less on the internet,
or ﬁnd ways to become more creative. In these cases the output of an hour of work (or better an hour at
work) may diﬀer and hence hours supplied are not necessarily a good measure of eﬀort. In some cases it is
also diﬃcult to measure hours of work in the ﬁrst place, such as for the self-employed or individuals whose
work may well be hard to distinguish from leisure time. In these cases the sensitivity of hours of work to
changes in wages or taxes is only a part of the story; indeed it may be a small part only. In terms of work
incentives the total income elasticity with respect to taxes is probably more relevant. However, in terms
of revenue and possibly also in terms of welfare the t a x a b l ei n c o m ee l a s t i c i t ywould also be required. Both
together would give a more complete picture as to how individuals change eﬀort and rearrange their income
and expenditure in response to taxes.
Key papers in this ﬁeld, constituting, the new tax responsiveness literature, have been written by Feldstein
(1995, 1999). He stresses the importance of considering taxable income for a number of reasons: taxation can
distort not only eﬀort but also the way one organises the sources of income and consumption to reduce tax
liability. Such reallocations of income from one source to another (e.g. employee earnings to self-employment)
or of consumption from one type to another that is tax deductible (e.g. from non-housing to housing in the
US) aﬀe c t sg o v e r n m e n tr e v e n u ea n dw e l f a r e . T h el a t t e ri st r u eb e c a u s ei n d i v i d u a l sa r en o ti n d i ﬀerent to
the type of consumption or even to the way that their income is generated. Thus, tax exempt consumption
19may not be a perfect substitute for ordinary consumption. The tax system may encourage individuals to
consume more housing, say, than they intended when interest payments are tax deductible (as in the US)
causing a welfare loss as behaviour is thus distorted. Hence, particularly for higher income individuals -
who, plausibly, have more opportunity to shift income and consumption to tax favoured forms and whose
main labour supply response is not measured directly through hours of work - a good way of summarising
the behavioural eﬀe c t so ft a x a t i o ni st h r o u g hi t se ﬀects on taxable income.
However, measuring these eﬀects is fraught with problems, some of which we discuss now. Perhaps the
key diﬃculty which prevents a structural economic modelling of these important dimensions is that we do
not observe eﬀort. If we cannot measure eﬀort, we cannot measure the price of eﬀort (termed the eﬀective
wage rate). As this is likely to diﬀer across the various skill group of workers the unobservability of eﬀort
and its eﬀective wage rate can become a very important confounding factor when measuring incentives. This
does pose a challenge for policy analysis and evaluation.
The most common estimation approach for the taxable income and total income elasticities has been
diﬀerence in diﬀerences comparing outcomes before and after reforms. To see how this works and to illustrate
some important problems, consider a single period model where utility depends on income and eﬀort.19 For
simplicity suppose we are interested in measuring the eﬀect of taxes on earnings, the latter being the product
of (unobserved) eﬀort and the price per unit of eﬀort. Conceptually the model is identical to the labour
supply one, with eﬀort substituted for hours. The appropriate wage rate is the after-tax marginal return to
eﬀort and the appropriate measure of non-labour income is the adjusted other income measure exactly as
in the hours discussion earlier. This adjusted measure does not depend separately on the price of eﬀort - so
the relevant measure of other or non-labour income is observed. However the price of eﬀort is not observed.
The standard approach has taken a simpliﬁed model, where the price of eﬀort is treated as an aggregate
time eﬀect, common across individuals (like a trend, which is the same for all) and where the income eﬀect
is ignored. The eﬀect of taxes is estimated by considering what happens to diﬀerent groups of individuals,
depending on their marginal tax rates, following a reform. To ﬁx ideas, suppose a higher rate of tax is
reduced by a reform. Individuals are split up depending on whether in the period before the reform their
marginal tax rate was the one to be reduced or not. In other words, they are split up by past income. The
approach to estimating the taxable income elasticity20, is then to compare the growth of earnings for the
19For further critical analysis of the Diﬀerence in Diﬀerences method and for examples of use and extensions see Blundell,
Duncan and Meghir (1998), Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) and Moﬃtt and Wilhelm (2000).
20see Feldstein (1995, 1999) for example.
20group that was subject to the tax reform on the basis of their pre-reform income (say the very high earners)
to a group with earnings just below the level at which the tax cut took eﬀect. The approach reports the
proportional change in earnings due to a proportional change in the share of income retained after tax: the
so-called taxable income elasticity.21
This approach is sensitive to three sources of bias The ﬁrst is due to "mean reversion": the income of
individuals is subject to temporary random changes. Following a large negative shock we can usually expect
income to grow again towards its previous level. Thus among people selected because they have lower income,
some have incomes that are only temporarily low and we can expect some positive income growth as this
temporary negative shock works its way out; among tho s ew i t hh i g h e ri n c o m ew ec a ne x p e c tn e g a t i v ei n c o m e
growth as those who had only temporarily high income experience a similar reversion to their typical income.
Both these movements would happen anyway, irrespective of the tax reform. In our empirical experiment this
mean reversion will be attributed to the tax reform and will lead to an underestimate of the eﬀect of lowering
taxes. This source of bias is discussed at length by Gruber and Saez (2000).22 The second source of bias
relates to the possibility that growth in income can be diﬀerent at diﬀerent parts of the income distribution.
This is particularly the case for some of the studies carried out using data from the 1980s when inequality
was growing rapidly. This means that the incomes of those higher up in the distribution are growing faster
than those lower down for reasons that may not be related to the tax reform directly and this will bias
upwards the eﬀect we wish to estimate. The ﬁnal source of bias relates to the eﬀect that a tax reform may
have on skill prices and hence on earnings. In general one can show that a tax reform reducing higher tax
rates will lead to a relative reduction in the skill price of those facing a lower tax rate. For example, cutting
marginal tax rates of high skill individuals may increase their hours and eﬀort, which may push down the
price of their labour. This will bias the eﬀect downwards. Thus these three sources of bias do not all go in
the same direction, creating some ambiguity on the credibility of the results. In Appendix 2 we consider this
issue in greater detail.
The above diﬃculties are compounded by the fact that reforms rarely involve the change of just one tax
rate and moreover the impact of the change may depend on adjusted non-labour income, which is typically
ignored by this approach. Thus, the results obtained, even if unbiased for a particular reform, are unlikely
to have much external validity and are more of a description of what happened in one speciﬁci n s t a n c e .T h i s
21Note that this is not the same as (minus) the elasticity of earnings with respect to the tax rate. The latter is -β t
1−t.
22Note that Feldstein categorises people on the basis of the pre-reform marginal tx rate. This is a function of the pre-reform
income. Hence although more complicated this is in eﬀect a categorisation by initial income and the same arguments apply.
21was illustrated clearly by Goolsbee (1999) who applied such a method to all major tax reforms in the 20th
century for which data was available and demonstrated that the results diﬀered widely from one reform to
another. In order to derive more general conclusions we need an approach that allows for the issues discussed
above as well as for income eﬀects and other complexities of the tax system. A credible structural model is
imperative in this as in many other areas of empirical economics.23
Moﬃtt and Wilhelm (2000), Gruber and Saez (2000) and Blow and Preston (2002) make the most serious
attempt to overcome the numerous problems we have listed above. In particular they discuss many of the
issues we raise here and they try to account for them, including allowing for income eﬀects, taking into
account of diﬀerential trends where possible, controlling for the mean reversion etc. In addition, Gruber
and Saez (2000) use information from many tax reforms taking into account the complexity of the changes.
Finally, they allow for diﬀerential trends to control for the change in inequality. Thus their approach is
closest to a structural approach whilst at the same time using actual reforms to estimate the eﬀects. They
cannot, however, get round the issue of changing eﬀort prices for diﬀerent skill groups. Finally, they use
two income measures; a broad income measure which reﬂects mainly changes in eﬀort and a more narrow
measure of taxable income, which also captures the eﬀects of avoidance. Their estimates are probably the
most credible available. Blow and Preston who consider the self-employed in the UK, also control for income
eﬀects and for mean reversion by grouping individuals by occupation and region. The key issue is whether
their grouping is correlated with tax liability and it clearly is. We next review the results of this and other
papers.
2 A Review of some Empirical Results on Labour Supply.
Much of the empirical analysis on labour supply concentrates on estimating wage elasticities. Some take
account explicitly of taxes. Few only are directly designed to ask speciﬁc policy questions, such as the eﬀect
of beneﬁts. The aim of this brief review of empirical results is to provide a picture of how sensitive labour
supply is to changes in work incentives and to see if we can provide a sense of consensus on what is currently
known about labour supply. Our aim is not a formal meta-analysis or even an exhaustive survey. However,
we hope that by providing information on the methods and a way of assessing reliability we can allow the
reader to decide for themselves, whilst providing our own guidance and the results of some “representative”
studies.
23see also the discussion of Goolsbee (1999) by Hall and Katz, which follow the article.
22Individuals who value leisure less and thus work longer hours than others are also likely to command
higher hourly wage rates24 and, abstracting from those with incomes low enough to be in receipt of means
tested beneﬁts, are likely to face higher marginal tax rates than those who work fewer hours (precisely
because they like to work more and thus earn more). This creates a circularity between incentives and eﬀort
and constitutes the classic endogeneity (or reverse causality) problem that plagues our attempts to estimate
the impact of incentives on hours of work. We will illustrate these issues with some examples.
Take someone who has a low preference for work and therefore works for few hours. This person is also
likely to have invested less in human capital accumulation and is thus likely to have a low pre-tax (gross) wage.
This causes a spurious positive correlation between hours and wages leading to an impression that incentives
and hence taxes may matter more than they actually do; this is the problem of endogeneity of the gross wage.
From a diﬀerent perspective the progressive tax system will lead us to underestimate incentive eﬀects if we do
not take into account its presence: individuals with a stronger preference for work will face higher tax rates
and hence, all else equal, will have lower after tax wages. This will cause a negative correlation between hours
and marginal after tax wages, which if not accounted for may lead to a downward bias in wage elasticities
and even reversal in signs, implying negative incentive eﬀects. The picture is further complicated by the fact
that some persons do not work. Typically those not working will have higher reservation wages. Workers are
thus drawn from the group of individuals who have a lower dislike for work. More to the point this selection
will generate a spurious correlation between preferences for work and wages or unearned income (µ in our
earlier notation): if we observe someone working at a particularly low wage they will have a high preference
for work and vice versa. Similarly a positive correlation will be induced between unearned income and
preferences for work. This illustrates at least three confounding factors working in opposing directions and
obscuring the genuine incentive eﬀects we need to estimate. While formal econometric techniques abound
for dealing with these issues, they do not oﬀer magical instant solutions: their eﬀectiveness will depend on
the credibility of the assumptions used when implementing them.
The above examples illustrate the diﬃculty of estimating wage eﬀects for labour supply and emphasizes
that the direction of bias is not known ap r i o r iand cannot be inferred. A number of early labour supply
studies25 emphasised the issues of endogeneity of taxes and solved the problem by explicitly taking into ac-
count how work preferences aﬀect the decision process that leads individuals to choose to work while facing
24They probably invested in education more when they were younger
25e.g. Heckman (1974), Burtless and Hausman (1978), Hausman (1985), Moﬃtt (1984), MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch (1990).
23as p e c i ﬁc marginal tax rate. In other words they modelled the dependence of tax rates on individual unob-
served preferences components. The most elaborate of these studies allow for measurement or optimisation
errors - where the individual is observed working a number of hours that diﬀers from those planned - as well
as preference heterogeneity. Issues that have not been addressed by this generation of models include unob-
served ﬁxed costs of work (other than those implied by the tax system) and the endogeneity of the pre-tax
(gross) wage rate. Ignoring these issues is likely to overstate the incentive eﬀects. A further issue, which
is equally important but a bit more esoteric in nature has been raised by MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch
(1990): the combination of estimation methods that impose theoretical consistency of the labour supply
model everywhere in the sample, with restrictive functional forms that do not allow enough curvature of the
relationship between hours, wages and unearned income, can lead again to an overstatement of incentives.
Estimating incentive eﬀects in a convincing way thus requires us to ﬁnd solutions to all these problems
at the same time. This calls for a suﬃciently ﬂexible approach, that allows for ﬁxed costs of work, does not
impose theory ap r i o r ieverywhere in the sample (thus in a sense increasing model ﬂexibility) uses exogenous
changes to work incentives to identify their eﬀect. and allows for taxes and beneﬁt s . T h i si so fc o u r s ea
large set of requirements, but all have been shown to be important empirically; in our review of empirical
results we will use these criteria to judge the value of the estimates. However, there will always be trade-oﬀs
in the way the model is implemented empirically. For example, Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1998), rather
than solving for the full solution to taxes simplify the problem substantially by exploiting the fact that
most working women would ﬁnd themselves paying a single basic rate of tax, once conditioning on having
a working husband. This approximation allowed them to treat the marginal wage as a single endogenous
variable; the cost of their approach is that the sample they use is selected and this has to be allowed for. They
then exploit the change in the UK wage structure and the numerous tax reforms that occurred to control
for the endogeneity of wages and taxes. Their approach uses the diﬀerential t i m es e r i e sv a r i a t i o ni na f t e r
tax wages for diﬀerent cohorts and diﬀerent education groups. Their identifying assumption is that while
preferences for work may be diﬀerent between education groups and cohorts, these diﬀerences are permanent.
Hence diﬀerential changes in the labour supply of these groups can be attributed to diﬀerential changes in
the incentives they face. Thus, the argument goes, given permanent diﬀerences in the work behaviour of
higher and lower education groups, a change in the relative wage between the two groups (say because of
changes in the tax structure following a reform) will reﬂect a pure change in the incentives faced by the
two groups and cause a change in their relative labour supplies. Thus illustrates the kind of reasoning and
24"experiments" that one needs to ﬁnd in the data to argue that the eﬀects of incentive have been uncovered.
In our view using changes over time in incentives that can be credibly considered as exogenous (i.e. unrelated
to observed aspects of preferences for work) and controlling suitably for aggregate changes shifts in hours of
work (time shocks) is the most convincing way of controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in this context.
The relative merits of treating taxation with a full solution approach or with approximations are less clear.
Here there is a trade-oﬀ between putting more structure (and thus making more assumptions) on the labour
supply problem and accurately taking into account of all the details of the tax system.
2.1 Empirical Results on Female Labour Supply
There have been a large number of studies focussing on female hours of work in the US, the UK and many
other developed economies. Research has focussed on women for a number of reasons. First, in may countries
they work fewer hours and participate less in the labour market than men; hence if they were to be drawn
into the labour market this could lead to substantial economic growth. In addition, their hours of work tend
to be more dispersed and there is a belief that they are more responsive to incentives, which implies that
they respond more to tax rate changes this being an important source of distortions due to the tax system.
Table A1 presents some of the estimates for married women. It becomes immediately obvious that the
range of estimates is very wide indeed. Very few estimates are, however, larger than 1 and all are positive.
However, those estimates (except Cogan, 1981) that rely on annual hours of work tend to be higher and
clustering close to 1. Those based on weekly hours tend to be much smaller. This is to be expected because
on an annual basis individuals have more margins of adjustment, such as weeks per year as well as hours per
week, than they do on a weekly basis.
Key empirical issues is the treatment of censoring, that arises as a result of some women not working,
endogenous wages and the treatment of taxes
One of the ﬁrst studies of female labour supply allowing for endogenous wages and recognising the eﬀect
on estimation of the fact that some women do not work is by Heckman (1974, 1974a). In the 1974a study
he ﬁnds an annual hours elasticity of 0.8 at 2000 hour of work and more at lower hours. He also reports an
eﬀect on weeks worked per year, which implies an elasticity of 1. This study is based on a single cross section
and some of the identiﬁcation assumptions may not be used now: he assumes that education and experience
aﬀect wages but not preferences, which may be biasing the elasticities upwards.
A further important distinguishing feature of the studies is whether they allow for ﬁxed costs of work.
25Ignoring ﬁxed costs tends to increase the labour supply elasticities. The ﬁrst study to allow for ﬁxed costs
of work is that of Cogan (1981).26 His annual hours of work elasticity at 1400 hours is 0.864 which adjusting
for hours, is lower than that of Heckman; other than ﬁxed costs he uses similar assumptions.
Arellano and Meghir (1992), allow for ﬁxed costs, endogeneity of taxes and pre-tax wages and non-
labour income and they ﬁnd elasticities for weekly hours of work in the range of 0.3-0.7, depending on the
demographic group. However, their identiﬁcation strategy, based on a single cross-sectional data relies on
education not having an independent eﬀect on hours of work as in the studies mentioned above.
Many of the early results are reviewed by Mroz (1987) who in addition applies the various methods
that had been used up to then to a data set he drew from the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID). He thus illustrates how sensitive the results can be to diﬀerent approaches. Of the estimates that
are not rejected by statistical tests the highest wage elasticities are about 0.12, while the unearned income
eﬀect is zero. His estimates, as well as those he reviews are based on cross sectional comparisons, meaning
that diﬀerences in incentives can usually be attributed to diﬀerences in education levels or other similar
characteristics, that we now believe also aﬀect preferences. Interestingly in all cases where Mroz allows for
taxes the incentive eﬀects turn out to be negative. We believe this is because the endogeneity of taxes is not
allowed for and the reverse causality eﬀects we discussed earlier is in eﬀect.
Several more recent studies are based on some time-series variation and relax many of the assumptions
imposed in the earlier studies. For instance, Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1998) use long time series
variation and allow for the endogeneity of pre and post-tax wages as well as for ﬁxed costs, without using the
assumption that all education groups have the same work preferences. In this study the highest elasticity
observed for weekly hours of work is found for those women who have young children. For all other married
women the wage elasticity is around 0.13, which implies a very low responsiveness of hours to small changes
in work incentives.
The prevailing consensus annual labour supply elasticity for women is close to 1. However, the annual
hours results that we report have to be regarded with some caution because they rely almost exclusively on
cross sectional comparisons. Weekly hours on the other hand respond much less to changes in wages with
elasticities in the range of approximately 0.0 - 0.30. These results are based on weaker assumptions than
26I nt h ep r e s e n c eo fﬁxed costs of work the individual needs to decide whether to work at all or not. If she decides to work
she works a suﬃcient number of hours to make it worth her while. Cogan (1981) termed this reservion hours. Thus wage
ﬂuctuations can lead to large jumps from zero hours to some large positive number, e.g. 20 hours. The same wage ﬂuctuation
for workers may lead to just a small hours adjustment. Thus under ﬁxed costs the hours adjustment is driven by diﬀerent
factors than the adjustment of whether one works or not. By ignoring ﬁxed costs one is forcing the model to explain hours and
participation changes in the same way, biasing upwards the eﬀect of wages on hours.
26those used in the annual hours results.
For the purposes of tax simulation and welfare analysis income elasticities are also very important both
for measuring welfare eﬀects and for obtaining the full behavioural eﬀects of a reform. First, a large income
eﬀect will translate a modest wage elasticity to a large compensated wage elasticity, which is the source of
deadweight loss. In addition the measure of unearned income will be a function of the tax rate when the
tax system is nonlinear as shown earlier. Thus the change in the tax rate will also aﬀect unearned income
providing an additional channel for a response to a tax change reinforcing the eﬀects of changes in marginal
tax rates. The range of estimates we ﬁnd in the literature is quite limited ranging from about -0.1 to -0.3
across all studies reported, again implying small behavioural eﬀects.
Putting all these results together the picture is of small elasticities for hours worked per week. For most
married women - other than those with pre-school children - working the mean 25 hours per week, it would
take a 20% increase in the wage rate to induce an increase of 1 hour in the work week. An elasticity of
0.2 with the income eﬀect at about the same level implies a compensated elasticity of 0.3. Thus if we just
consider hours the welfare and incentive eﬀects of wage/tax changes are quite small. As already emphasized
in a nonlinear tax system the impact of a change in the marginal wage would be reinforced by the income
eﬀect. However, this is also small. Finally, with non-convex budget sets, such as those induced by tax-credits
or other welfare beneﬁts, some individuals may respond to quite small tax changes by a large repositioning
in their hours of work decisions. Although low elasticities are likely to imply that the number of these
individuals may be small, the ﬁnal outcome depends very much on the overall shape of the budget constraint
and on the distribution of hours of work.
The results on annual labour supply show greater responsiveness to wages. Annual labour supply can be
viewed as combining the eﬀect of adjustment across many diﬀerent margins: These include hours per week,
weeks per year as well as participation, the latter because annual hours of work will vary as the individual
takes time oﬀ between jobs. So it follows that with similar methods the annual hours adjustments should
be more sensitive to wages than any one of these margins, at least if leisure across all these margins is a
normal good. However, we believe that more empirical work is needed to establish the responsiveness of
annual hours of work to work incentives.
272.1.1 Female Participation Elasticities
Several studies allow us to look more closely at participation elasticities, and the results of these suggest
that this is an important margin of adjustment (and may explain much of the diﬀerence between weekly
and annual hours results). Table A2 presents the results of several of the main studies that look separately
at participation responsiveness. Aaberge et al (1999) and Arrufat and Zabalza (1986) ﬁnd results of 0.65,
1.41 respectively using cross-sectional datasets from Italy and the UK. Both these studies allow for taxes
and their endogeneity but are based on a single cross section. Possibly the most comprehensive study here
is by Pencavel (1998) which covers a long period of time, documenting changes in participation for diﬀerent
schooling groups and estimating participation eﬀects of wages with various approaches and instrument sets.
However, Pencavel does not allow for the tax system and use pre-tax wage rates. He ﬁnds a range of
elasticities from 0.7-1.8 with various approaches. Devereux (2004) (who also ignores taxes), ﬁnds a lower
degree of responsiveness with the elasticity at the median family income equal to 0.17 As with Aaberge, he
ﬁnds evidence that participation is more elastic amongst women from poorer families, and together their
results suggest that participation is likely to be the key margin of adjustment for poorer women. We look
at this issue below when considering lone mothers. Thus the overall consensus (with the exception of the
result by Devereux) is that participation elasticities for married women are quite high and that this margin
for adjustment is perhaps more important than weekly hours of work.
2.1.2 The Labour Supply of Lone Mothers
Lone mothers form a demographic group of special policy interest because they tend to be poor and because
they face very high costs of work. Creating the right conditions and incentives for them to work and thus
escape poverty has been a central concern of the UK government. The main tool for this purpose has been the
Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) and its successor Working Tax Credit (WTC). From the perspective
of understanding how eﬀective such interventions are likely to be we need to know the extent to which lone
mothers are likely to respond to work incentives.
There have been a number of papers estimating directly the eﬀect of in-work beneﬁt programmes on
lone mother labour supply as well as more conventional labour supply studies. A collection of some results
is presented in Table A3. Eissa and Liebman (1996) estimate a participation elasticity for loan mothers of
1.16, using directly diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences based on a reform on the Earned Income Tax Credit in the US.
Their approach has the advantage of using the variation induced by the reform. However, the control group
28(mothers without children) is suﬃciently diﬀerent from the treatment group and with such high participation
rates that this puts into question the ability of the approach to control for overall trends and thus to credibly
estimate the eﬀects of the reform. A convincing alternative approach is given by Brewer et al (2005) who
combine the use of a structural model of labour supply with the reform to the UK WFTC system to estimate
the impact of the reform to the UK Working Families Tax Credit. Again the implied participation elasticity
with respect to in-work income is 1.02. For the US, one of the most comprehensive studies, which is based
on a long time series of cross sections and exploits the numerous reforms in the US over the 80s and 90s
with cross state variability is that of Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001). From their speciﬁcation it is diﬃcult to
compute an elasticity of participation with respect to wages, because changing these, would aﬀect disposable
income not only through after tax earnings when in work, but also through beneﬁt eligibility. However, they
conclude that the incentive eﬀects of taxation and beneﬁts are substantial; over the period 1984-96 they
attribute about 62% of the change in employment of lone mothers relative to single women to changes in
taxation; 25% of the change is attributed to changes in beneﬁts over the same period.
The other participation elasticities presented in the Table are similarly quite large. It is reassuring that
the ones based on actual reforms lead to similar conclusions as the ones based on comparing individuals
facing diﬀerent wages. Thus there is a strong consensus in the literature that the participation elasticity
for lone mothers is among the highest of all demographic groups. This implies that thoughtfully designed
policies should be able to attract quite a few into work thus improving substantially their long run standard
of living.
Finally, Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1992) estimate a structural model of lone mother labour supply
and provide estimates for the elasticity of hours with respect to small changes in the wage rate. Although
the credibility of these estimates is undermined by the fact that they rely on a single cross section, the
results are quite similar to what we saw before, with the largest elasticity reported as 0.34, very much like
the results on married female labour supply discussed above.
2.2 Male Labour Supply
There has been a consistent eﬀort to measure male labour supply elasticities. One key characteristic of male
labour supply in many countries is that men work primarily full time. In the UK for example, although
there is some variability in actual hours of work there is a clear lack of individuals working below a certain
level such as 35 hours, as shown in Figure 6 for the UK. In the US one also observes a great concentration














































































of annual hours of work at the full time all year work. This does pose a number of generally unanswered
questions, relating to why such a concentration exists and how it should be treated in practice. Most studies
ignore these issues and attempt to estimate the labour supply curve with continuous hours.
The results obtained generally show low income and wage elasticities for hours of work (see Table A4). A
variety of methods and datasets have been used and there is a consensus that the sensitivity of hours worked
is very small. So although one can start discussing the relative merits of the approaches taken, existing
research will lead to the conclusion that the wage elasticity of hours of work is close to zero. For example,
MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch, which represents one of the most comprehensive and carefully carried out
studies, report an elasticity of zero for the US. Pencavel reports a number of negative elasticities. At the
same time the income elasticities reported are low and also close to zero. As we reported above, some groups
of women, particularly those with young children, showed wage elasticities as high as 0.4. No male elasticity
is reported as high as that. It would be a fair description to say that male hours adjustment to changes in
marginal wages is very low indeed and can almost be ignored for welfare purposes. However, this may not
be the right margin to consider. We will thus also consider employment elasticities, which we will show are
quite high for unskilled men and total income elasticities, which are quite high for high earning/high skill
30men (see Table A5).27
Due to historic very high rates of participation for males, most of the empirical literature has abstracted
from the participation decision and there are very few estimates of the standard participation elasticity for
men. However, Aaberge et al (1999) produce an estimate of approximately 0.05.
However, an extensive literature has also investigated the impact of unemployment insurance on the
duration of employment and this has found signiﬁcant evidence that a higher replacement rate (i.e. reduced
incentives to work) have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on duration. Much of this work occurred in the 1970s and 1980s
and has found elasticities in the range of 0.5 - 1.0 for the duration of unemployment. Taking an initial
replacement rate of 50%, a 10% increase in net income when in employment would decrease unemployment
duration by between 2.3% and 4.5%. Hill (1982) argues that estimates may be upwardly biased however,
because many of those only unemployed for a short duration ﬁnd jobs before beneﬁt claims are made or
processed, and if their replacement ratio is recorded as zero (as it would be, based on actual receipts) this
leads to a spurious positive correlation between duration and replacement ratio. However, if entitlement is
calculated based on eligibility rules rather than using actual receipts, this problem can be overcome. Using
this approach Nickell (1979) ﬁnds an elasticity of between 0.61 and 0.99, similar to previous results. If one
assumes that of prime aged Males, a total of 10% are unemployed at any one time (including non-participants
who would be willing to work), the uncompensated participation elasticity is approximately 0.04. This low
estimate should not detract from the sizeable impact out-of-work beneﬁts have on unemployment duration.
We are not convinced that the research on male participation has adequately dealt with the numerous
confounding factors. Again most of the estimates are based on simple cross sectional comparisons and not
on exogenous changes in the incentive structure. This is an important omission and we his present our own
estimates for the UK based on a very long time series of cross sections and based on the numerous changes
in the tax system and the widening of the wage distribution.
2.3 Family Labour Supply - The Collective Model
Family labour supply is a particularly diﬃcult area for two reasons. First we need to deal with a joint tax
system, which can be very complicated because beneﬁts are often assessed on the basis of family income. As
a result determining the incentive eﬀects of a reform requires solving jointly over both labour supplies in the
face of a budget “plane” which may be non-convex. Second, beyond this we also face the conceptual problem
27French (2005) sows that that male labor supply at certain ages is very elastic, with intertemporal elasticities as high as 1.2.
However, for prime age men the elasticities seem to be consistently lower.
31of how to model a household. Should we use the “unitary” framework where the household is viewed as a
unit with a well deﬁned preference ordering? Should we recognise the individuality of each member of the
household, with their own preferences and deﬁne/model the way they share resources? And if so should
we follow the collective approach, which assumes within household eﬃciency or should we admit ineﬃcient
outcomes? There has been a recent increase in interest in such models. Blundell, Chiappori, Magnac and
Meghir (2007) estimate a collective model of family labour supply, where the male has the choice of working
or not - hours are not modelled and where the female chooses hours and participation. The model does not
take into account of taxes. The wage elasticity for female labour supply is estimated to be 0.66 and the non-
labour income elasticity 0.72. Donni (2003, 2007) allows for taxes in a collective model. More recently Lise
and Seitz (2007), use the collective model with taxes to account for changes in within household inequality,
when considering overall inequality. The reported elasticity of substitution between consumption and labour
supply is over 1, implying strong incentive eﬀects. Although recent developments are encouraging, we believe
a lot more needs to be done here before we can be conﬁdent that we have a reliable family labour supply
model that can be used for public policy analysis. It is a clear case where better data on how families share
resources and allocate time to various activities, is crucial.
2.4 Dynamic Models of Labour Supply
We now turn to models that recognise explicitly intertemporal linkages. In some cases these linkages are due
to savings. In this context intertemporal substitution is reﬂected in the Frisch elasticity, which represents
the willingness of individuals to postpone leisure in favour of work during periods of anticipated high wages.
As we explained earlier the Frisch (or intertemporal substitution elasticity) does not have a direct policy
implication but it is an upper bound for the standard Marshallian elasticity that we have been discussing.
In Table A6 we present some results from the literature. Most of the results are for male hours, although
we also present results by Heckman and MaCurdy (1980,1983) and Blundell, Meghir and Neves (1993) for
women. As we may expect elasticities are higher than the equivalent within period ones.
A study that stands out in this literature because of the type of data used is that of Pistaferri (2003)
on Italian data. He uses subjective expectations data to decompose actual wage changes in anticipated and
unanticipated changes. He ﬁnds an intertemporal elasticity of substitution for men of 0.7, which is larger
than usual. He also estimates the elasticity of a complete shift in the wage proﬁle (i.e. allowing for wealth
eﬀects) of 0.5. This is perhaps the most relevant elasticity for tax reform analysis, if we are to assume
32that individuals perceive this to be permanent. Given the quality of the expectations data the estimate
of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution should be quite robust, unless of course the human capital
considerations raised by Imai and Keane are important. However, the Pistaferri approach to estimating
the eﬀect of unanticipated changes to the wage proﬁle, on hours of work relies on the assumption that any
unaccounted changes to preferences for hours of work are not correlated with updates to wage expectations;
this may be controversial. Moreover, comparing this to the paper by French (2005), while Pistaferri does
allow for taxes, by using the after tax wage, he does not take into account explicitly the implications of
nonlinearities in the tax code, as French does. Nevertheless, this potential criticism should not detract from
the fact that this study uses unique data on expectations and as such adds a new dimension to this literature.
His estimate is both reasonable and credible.
Beyond the intertemporal issues relating to savings there is a growing literature that introduces other
important dimensions. These models, which include human capital accumulation on the job and education
choices and highlight a number of important points, such as the possible propagation eﬀects of taxation
through its impact on job experience and wages.
Two studies have highlighted the importance of dynamics and “non-separabilities” over time, i.e. the
case where current choices aﬀect future preferences for work or future wages (or both). Hotz et al. (1988)
show convincingly that preferences are likely to be nonseparable over time. This means that individuals
working a lot today are likely to shift their preferences in the future and in the citation mentioned towards
more work tomorrow. This may imply that incentive eﬀects are reinforced by habits.
A further important example is provided by Imai and Keane (2004). In their paper current work hours
enhance individual skills and thus lead to higher wages in the future adding to the work incentives. In their
empirical results the intertemporal elasticity of labour supply with respect to wages is 3.82, which is very
much larger than anything previously estimated using microeconomic data. Theirs is a joint model of savings
and labour supply, where past hours and accumulated human capital aﬀects wages. The economic implication
is that the opportunity cost of leisure for young low paid workers is very high. As the importance of training
declines with the lifecycle this opportunity cost also declines, but wages increase. Thus despite the sensitivity
of labour supply to wages, hours of work do not vary much over the lifecycle. Moreover, for the young the
opportunity cost of leisure is so high, due to the loss of future earnings that it implies that the elasticity
for the young is much lower. Indeed the labour supply elasticity, allowing for the implied eﬀects of human
capital accumulation is lower and depending on age ranges from 0.8 for a 20 year old to 3 for a 60 year old.
33Even allowing for this consideration hours would probably vary considerably as a response to a permanent
shift in the life-cycle proﬁle of wages, such as would be implied by a change in the tax rate, particularly
for older individuals where human capital accumulation is less relevant. This analysis demonstrates the
potential importance of allowing for dynamics in understanding the impact of policy. However, the speciﬁc
results may be questionable because the authors do not allow for any persistent unobserved heterogeneity
and all shocks are taken to be independent over time. All persistence is assumed to be state dependence in
the jargon of this literature.28 This casts serious doubt on the robustness of this empirical analysis and the
credibility of this high elasticity.
A further example of important policy dimensions, beyond the work incentives is oﬀered in Adda et al.
(2006) who specify a model with human capital accumulation, job mobility (between ﬁrms) and labour force
participation. The Adda et al. model is estimated using German administrative data, where individuals are
observed from the point when they enter the labour market and followed up during their whole career.29
This model also considers the choice to undertake vocational education and thus includes labour supply,
training and job mobility in one integrated framework. This allows us to address directly the importance or
otherwise of tax and beneﬁt reforms on longer term training decisions, as well as labour supply.
Adda et al report the eﬀects of introducing an EITC programme in Germany. The programme is assumed
permanent and they estimate the eﬀects on cohorts who have not yet completed their training decisions.
They report that a programme characterised by the same parameters as the US one would increase overall
participation by 1%. It would also reduce the proportion trained by about 6 percentage points as the policy
reduces the life-cycle returns to training at the bottom of the earnings distribution. This demonstrates
that policies designed to support low income individuals may well have other sizeable eﬀects, which may be
unwanted and may work against the original purpose of the policy design.
2.5 Taxable and Total Income Elasticities
We now present results found in the “New Tax Responsiveness” literature and which relate to the eﬀects
of taxation on taxable income. The elasticities relatee i t h e rt os o m eb r o a di n c o me measure that includes
28Quite clearly people who work a lot in one period, also tend to work a lot in the next. Moreover people who work a lot
now tend to have higher wages in the future. This phenomenon can be attributed to diﬀerent causes: Perhaps some people
are productive and always tend to work a lot - this is the unobserved heterogeneity story; or perhaps some people work a lot
because (as in Imai and Keane) they realise that this will increase their skill and hence their wages, which of course then leads
them to want to work more; this is the state dependence story. The policy implications are vastly diﬀerent depending on which
is the case. Distinguishing between these two phenomena is the holy grail of empirical labour economists.
29To be speciﬁc they are dealing with German blue collar workers who have a choice to become qualiﬁed with an apprenticeship
degree, or not.
34expenditure on tax deductible items or to taxable income. All elasticities are with respect to the share of
income retained (i.e. the eﬀect of a percentage change in 1−t as opposed to a percentage change in t). The
distinction matters because away from a 50% tax rate a 10% percentage increase in the tax rate will not
correspond to a 10% increase in the proportion of income retained.30 We already discussed the theoretical
and practical issues underlying this approach. The results in Table A7 need to be interpreted carefully and
subject to the caveats already discussed.
In his seminal paper Feldstein (1995) uses a two-period (1985 and 1988) panel of married individuals with
incomes exceeding $30,000 to analyse the impact of the 1986 tax reform on the taxable incomes of those with
middle and high levels of income. Using a simple diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences methodology, he ﬁnds a signiﬁcant
elasticity of taxable income of between 1.1 and 3.05 (depending upon deﬁnition), and of broader “adjusted
gross income” of between 0.75 and 1.3. Sillamaa & Veall (2000) use the 1988 Canadian tax reforms as their
source of identifying variation, and break down results by source of income. For the whole sample, taxable
income from employment has an elasticity of 0.22, whilst self-employment income has an elasticity of 1.12;
restricting the sample to those with high incomes increases gross taxable income elasticities considerably,
but no separate elasticities by source are given.
Goolsbee (1999) demonstrates the fragility of the diﬀerence in diﬀerence approach. He used the same
approach for a number of reforms in the 20th century. He shows that the elasticity varies considerably from
one reform to another. This illustrates precisely the diﬃculty of the approaches being followed as well as the
characterisation of the reform as consisting of a single tax rate. First the aggregate conditions may diﬀer
between each reform. If the estimator does not control for aggregate eﬀects the biases will diﬀer each time,
sometimes increasing and sometimes decreasing the estimates. Second, reforms rarely aﬀect just one relevant
marginal rate; hence the estimates will be a function of other factors changing. Third, the constant elasticity
assumption is likely to be invalid. Fourth, the GE eﬀects we mentioned may be quite diﬀerent each time,
depending on which groups are being compared, for example.
As we already mentioned, three papers attempt to address the numerous issues raised above and allow
for the economic structure of the problem. Interestingly all three papers support quite high elasticities of
total or taxable income, although not all as high as one. (2000) using the Survey of Consumer Finances and
b a s e do nt h e1 9 8 6t a xr e f o r mo b t a i na na d j u s t e dg r o s si n c o m ee l a s t i c i t y( A G I )f o rt h eU So fa b o u t2 ,c l o s e
30Hall, in his discussion of Goolsbee emphasises this point: To get to a tax elasticity and hence to a Laﬀer type result one
needs to multiply the elasticities presented here t/(1−t). For marginal tax rates less than 50% this implies that the tax elasticity
is lower than the elasticity with respect to the share of earnings retained.
35to the Feldstein results when using a similar methodology. They then proceed to control for mean reversion
of income by classifying people based on the pre-reform value of their house (which is unlikely to be subject
to mean reversion in the short run). They also control for other characteristics; with these adjustments they
obtain even higher elasticities of about 2.5, indeed as we would predict from our analysis of the diﬀerence in
diﬀerences estimator. However, none of these approaches can control for the rising inequality, which could
be driving part of the increase of the incomes for the richer versus the poorer individuals. Interestingly
they ﬁnd an annual hours elasticity of 0.2 for middle income individuals but zero for the “rich”, which is
consistent with all the studies we have been reporting. 31
Gruber and Saez (2000) have presented probably the most comprehensive study in this literature. There
are certain important diﬀerences with the Moﬃtt and Wilhelm (2000) paper, although not all represent
improvements: ﬁrst Gruber and Saez pool information from a large number of reforms using more informa-
tion. Second, they match individuals on past income as a way of getting round the mean reversion problem
and they predict the tax position based on past income; this is an interesting approach to the problem,
but not necessarily better to grouping individuals based on constant or slow moving characteristics that are
correlated with income as Moﬃtt and Wilhelm do. Finally, they allow for income eﬀects and take a more
structural and theoretically coherent modelling approach. Probably as a result of pooling information from
many reforms, they obtain a more modest taxable income elasticity of 0.4 overall. For those on incomes in
excess of $100,000 the elasticity is 0.57 which is quite high but well below 1. They also consider a ‘Broad-
income’ deﬁnition with an estimated elasticity of 0.12 for the whole sample. Both numbers are of course
important, ﬁrst and foremost because as Feldstein stressed reallocating income and consumption to avoid
tax has welfare consequences. Indeed these numbers show that the largest of these eﬀects is the income
reallocation eﬀect and not eﬀort; this is consistent with the low hours elasticities we have reported. It is
noteworthy that the elasticity for those with high income is as high as 0.57 showing that the revenue to
be gained by high marginal tax rates for the “rich” are not very large, at least in the US, and the welfare
consequences may be high.32
Finally, Blow and Preston (2002) use tax returns of the self-employed in the UK. They use grouped
31"Adjusted gross income (AGI) is a United States tax term for an amount used in the calculation of an individual’s income
tax liability. AGI includes all gross income adjusted by certain allowed deductions, and is an important benchmark determining
certain other allowed beneﬁts. Gross income includes wages, interest income, dividend income, income from certain retirement
accounts, capital gains, alimony received, rental income, royalty income, farm income, unemployment compensation, and certain
other kinds of income." Source: Wikepedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adjusted_Gross_Income
32Note that Gruber and Saez (2000) ﬁnd very low income eﬀects, which implies that these elasticities can be taken as
compensated ones.
36data by region and occupation to construct a pseudo panel over a period that includes major tax changes.
By grouping the data in this way they get round the mean reversion problem and at the same time create
groups that diﬀer in their sensitivity to tax, simply because some occupations tend to be remunerated better
than others. Their model is again inspired by the standard labour supply model and also allows for income
eﬀects. They ﬁnd a range of elasticities depending on the group considered. These are mostly well over 1
implying that the taxable income of the self-employed is very sensitive to the tax rate and indeed increases
in tax rates may lead to reductions in the revenue raised from this group. This group has most scope of
reallocating income in the UK tax code. Unfortunately, their speciﬁcation forces the elasticity to decline
with income, which does go against the main intuition in this literature, namely that elasticities are higher
at high income levels. The Blow and Preston results for the UK are not necessarily inconsistent with those
of Gruber and Saez. The former consider the self-employed; the latter consider the entire population, which
will have less opportunity to reallocate income to non-taxable activities.
In Table 7 we present numerous elasticities that have been estimated based on a number of diﬀerent
reforms. They present quite a diversity of results, consistent with the Goolsbee study. Our view is that the
Gruber and Saez study presents the most reliable set of estimates. In addition Brewer, Saez and Shephard
(this volume) provides taxable income elasticities for the top 1% of UK earners, likely the group with the
greatest potential for avoidance. They ﬁnd a range of estimates with the lowest one being 0.46 and the
highest close to 1. This set of numbers is consistent with the American literature discussed in more detail
in this chapter.
3 Revisiting Male labour Supply
In reviewing the literature on labour supply it became apparent to us that there was no clear consensus of
robust results. This led us to estimate a model of male labour force participation using the best methods
available and relying on policy reforms to identify the eﬀects. We thus combine the approaches of Blundell,
Duncan and Meghir (1998) and Blundell, Reed and Stoker (2003) to identify the eﬀect of wages, taxes and
beneﬁts on the male work decision.33
33The approach we use is similar in spirit to that used by Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) for lone mohers in the US. However,
they use as explanatory variables predicted taxes and beneﬁts if the person works and predicted beneﬁts if the person does not,
all as separate variables. we use total income in work and total income out of work as explanatory variables.
373.1 The Model
We specify a model of the probability that someone works. This depends on total income measures in and
out of work. In deciding whether to work or not he considers what total income he would have if he did
decide to work; this leads to some level of satisfaction while in work. He compares this to the satisfaction
obtained if he decides not to work and obtains whatever income welfare and other sources will provide. This
is a combination of various means-tested welfare beneﬁts, including the Job Seeker’s Allowance and Housing
Beneﬁt. The latter consists of payments towards rent and on certain occasions mortgage payments. The
total amount of out of work income to which an individual is eligible will depend on housing costs and on
family composition.
The in-work utility/satisfaction is complicated by the fact that whether out of choice or chance individuals
can work a number of diﬀerent hours of work. In this study we assume that individuals work a random number
of hours and that the only decision they make is whether to work or not. We then evaluate in-work utility at
the expected in-work income. The determination of actual hours of work will be disregarded here.34 In work
income is thus constructed as follows. We split hours in intervals from 0-60+ and we assign a probability for
each interval consistent with what is actually observed in the data. We then evaluate income at the average
hours of each interval depending on pre-tax earnings at that point and taking into account all taxes and
beneﬁts (including tax-credits) for which the individual is eligible if he were to work that many hours. The
measure of in-work income is then the weighted average of post-tax and beneﬁti n c o m ea ta l lt h e s ep o i n t s .
It should be noted that where the individual has a spouse, both the in-work and out-of-work measures of
income take account of the spouse’s actual earnings, without considering the possibility that she may change
her decision as a result of what he does.
Now consider the impact of a reform. If this reform changes earnings at a point where there is a high
probability of observing a worker it will have a much larger impact on in-work income than if it changes
them at a point with low probability. While this is realistic, it does not allow for the impact of a change
in hours in response to a reform of taxes or beneﬁts. Nevertheless, this may be less of a restriction than it
sounds at least for reasonably small scale reforms, because the overall consensus is that hours are in fact
quite insensitive, particularly for men.
34Formally, the correct model would be to compute the in work probability as the average probability of working all possible
hours. For the purpose of this study we simpliﬁed matters by computing one probability of working evaluated at the expected
in-work income.
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Estimating a model of male employment
Here we discuss the more technical issue of identifying and estimating the eﬀects of
incentives of the work probability. We start by deﬁning the utility from working to be
UP = aP + bPY P + cP0X
and similarly the utility from not working
UNP = aNP + bNPY NP + cNP0X + e
where Y P are Y NP are measures of total after tax income including any beneﬁts when in
work and out of work respectively. The X variables are taste-shifters which aﬀect individual
welfare diﬀerently when the individual works and when he does not. These include year
dummies, to reﬂect changing preferences over time, education and age, as well as region.
Similarly income has a diﬀerent impact on utility depending on whether it is received in
work or out of work; his reﬂects the fact that income my be valued diﬀerently when working
and when out of work. Finally e is an unobserved term expressing the relative preference for
work vis a vis non-work and which diﬀers across individuals - this is the usual econometric
"error term" . We will assume for simplicity that it is normally distributed. The work
decision compares these two utilities allowing for the diﬀerent incomes in and out of work




+ bPY P − bNPY NP +( cP − cNP)0X
Implementing the estimation of the work probability and identifying the eﬀects of income in
and out of work requires us to observe wages for the entire sample. Moreover, we wish to
allow for the possibility that pre-tax wages are correlated with (unobserved) preferences for
work (endogenous pre-tax wages). This is addressed by using predicted rather than actual
wages for both workers and non-workers.




t Ait + γedRegion + uit (1)
where Ait age eﬀects and Region is a set of region dummies and the superscript ed signiﬁes
a parameter which varies according to which education group a person belongs to. Thus
t h ew a g ee q u a t i o ni ss p e c i ﬁc to each education group and all coeﬃcients vary with time.
The main conceptual diﬃculty with estimating this equation here is the fact that wages are
observed for workers only. To correct for selection we use the well known Heckman (1979)
two step estimator. The key assumption that allows us to do this is is that the income that
one would gain when out of work can be taken as random once we take as given family
composition, housing tenure and region. The randomness comes partly from government
policy changes and the way that changes in the housing market conditions aﬀects the level
of beneﬁts to be received. More formally the instrument for correcting for this selectivity
bias is deﬁned by
Zit = Y NP − G0
itγ
w h e r ew eh a v ed e ﬁned E(Y NP|Family composition,tenure, region, time)=G0
itγ, with
Git representing the variables in brackets and where the time dummies enter additively with
no interactions with the other variables. By taking the residual rather than the level of
non-work income we avoid the endogeneity problem arising from the potential correlation
of family composition and region with wages. Thus we start by estimating a reduced form
probit equation for participation including time eﬀects interacted with region and education
and the instrument Zit deﬁned above. Based on this reduced form probit we construct the
inverse Mills ratio, which we then include in the wage equation. Using the estimated wage
equation 1 we predict wages for all individuals, whether they work or not.
39Box 3.
Estimating a model of male employment (continued)
We will use these wages to construct in work income for each individual. Each person
is assigned a predicted wage. Then for each person we evaluate income, whether working
or not, allowing for all beneﬁts and taxes (depending on personal circumstances) and based
on this predicted wage for hours 0,23,37,41,46,51,63. Note that actual income earned based
on actual hours for workers is disregarded, making the measure comparable for workers and
non-workers.
Following the computation of the two measures of income, in work and out of work we
can estimate the participation probability using a probit model. However there is still one
important diﬃculty here. We cannot take these measures as exogenous for the participation
equation, even if they are based on predicted wages: higher preferences for work due to
unobservables will tend to be related to higher marginal tax rates; this is but one example of
reverse causality. We thus use a "two stage least squares" approach, where the two measures
of income are predicted using appropriate instruments. To motivate the instruments we need
to explain the policy context and the reforms of the 1980s that subsequently aﬀected the
evolution of transfer income right through the period of our investigation (1994 to 2004).
3.1.1 Where does the variability of income come from?
To credibly estimate the eﬀects of taxes and beneﬁts we need to argue that these incomes vary across time
and individuals for reasons that are unrelated to work preferences. Over the sample period of our data
numerous reforms took place changing the levels of beneﬁts and taxes at various points in time. In itself this
is not suﬃcient because the eﬀects of the policy reforms could be confounded with aggregate shifts in hours
of work. However these reforms have aﬀected diﬀerent groups of individuals diﬀerently as argued in Blundell,
Duncan and Meghir (1998). One such reform is crucial to identiﬁcation and has been used in particular by
Blundell, Reed and Stoker (2003). In the 1980s the public housing rents started growing at the market rate
following a reform of the then government. The implication is that housing beneﬁt, which compensates one
for rents started rising in line with these increases. As the housing market moved in diﬀerent ways across
diﬀerent parts of the country this meant that out of work income would change in diﬀerential ways across
the country too. Once we control for aggregate time eﬀects and region we rely on this residual variation
(i.e. region-time interactions) to identify the impact of out-of-work income on labour supply. The same
set of reforms will also help identify the eﬀect of in-work income, which also depends on housing beneﬁt.
However, further reforms, including tax credits and changes in the tax rates will induce further variability
in this measure, which will aﬀect individuals in diﬀerent cohorts diﬀerently.
Given the above discussion, there will be substantial diﬀerential eﬀects on beneﬁt entitlement due to the
reforms in diﬀerent parts of the country. Thus instead of using the actual in-work and out of work income
40measures, which depend on actual housing costs which may be endogenous (in the sense that they relate
to household preferences and past choices), we predict these and thus average them over diﬀerent types of
households; we only use the variation over time diﬀerent regions and education groups. Moreover, we never
use actual in-work income; rather we use in-work income derived by using predicted wages and taking averages
over all possible hours intervals, with weights the observed distribution of hours. The participation equation
excludes time-region and time-education interactions, allowing only for constant region and education eﬀects
in labour supply as well as additive time eﬀects. This assumes that preferences for work do not exhibit
diﬀerent trends across groups.
3.1.2 The data
Our data source is the Family Resources Survey (FRS). This is an annual cross sectional survey of approx-
imately 23,000 households in Great Britain and has been designed speciﬁcally for socio-economic research
with a focus on income, expenditures and employment. We use 11 annual waves of the FRS from 1994 to
2004 and choose a sample of men, either single or living with partners and aged between 22-59 inclusive.
We exclude the self-employed, those in full-time education and those entitled to disability beneﬁts as well as
those living in Northern Ireland. This leaves us with a sample of 31,461 single males (with an average age
of 35), and a sample of 91,372 men with partners (with an average age of 41).
The in-work and out-of-work net incomes are calculated using the IFS tax and beneﬁt model (TAXBEN)
and are derived using the full set of determinants of taxes and beneﬁts as observed in the FRS. This model
combined with the FRS is remarkably accurate at predicting tax revenues and beneﬁt expenditures.
3.1.3 Results
In Table 1 we present the “marginal eﬀects” of increasing the two income measures on the probability of
participation by education group and marital status of the man.35 Thus each number represents the increase
(or decrease for negative numbers) of the probability of work as a result of a percentage increase in out-of-
work or in-work income respectively. First note that dealing with endogeneity of in-work income in particular
is very important and indeed the bias is the direction one would expect: the positive correlation between
the tax rate faced and the propensity to work means that everything else equal, those most favourable to
35These are changes in probability of work corresponding to unit increase in the income measure. Each person has two
income measures: one is the predicted income were he to work (in-work income) and one is the predicted income were he not to
work (out-of work income). The combination of these two measures together with their coeﬃcients reﬂects the return to work
for each individual. The participation probability does not depend on the diﬀerence in incomes, but on the income measures
individually with separate weights: each income measure has a diﬀerent weight because income is valued diﬀerently when in
work than when out of work.
41Income Exogenous Income Endogenous
Log out-of-work Log in-work Log out-of-work Log in-work
income income income income
Single Men
Low Education -0.1837 -0.0243 -0.2517 0.1683
(0.0079) (0.0302) (0.0509) (0.0936)
Medium Education -0.0583 -0.1359 -0.1411 0.3081
(0.0086) (0.0325) (0.0418) (0.0770)
High Education -0.0300 -0.1402 -0.0061 0.0732
(0.0061) (0.0276) (0.0304) (0.0469)
Married or Cohabiting Men
Low Education -0.2220 0.3636 -0.1698 0.3182
(0.0041) (0.0066) (0.0348) (0.0644)
Medium Education -0.1039 0.1526 -0.1246 0.1267
(0.0052) (0.0092) (0.0274) (0.0480)
High Education -0.0608 0.1152 -0.0515 0.0341
(0.0039) (0.0081) (0.0292) (0.0413)
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 1: Wage and Income paticipation elasticities for Men (UK).
working for reasons of preference also end up with lower after tax in-work income (because of taxation),
causing a negative bias. This is clearly the case for single men where the results in the ﬁrst two columns,
that do not allow for endogeneity, give negative incentive eﬀects. Once we deal with this issue the incentive
eﬀects of higher in-work income become apparent (last column).
The results in the last two columns are sensible. First, income incentives matter most for the lower
educated individuals. The participation probability of higher educated persons responds less to both changes
in out of work and in in-work income. Indeed for those with College education the eﬀects are not signiﬁcant
at conventional levels and the point estimates are very small. However, for those with statutory education
the marginal eﬀects are large. At a participation rate of 60%, which is about the number for the unskilled,
the elasticity of participation with respect to in-work income is 0.27 for single men and about 0.53 for married
men. The out of work income elasticities for the two groups are 0.42 and 0.60 respectively. These are quite
high numbers and imply that welfare beneﬁts can have substantial eﬀects on the work behaviour of unskilled
and even for men with high school education. However as we argued earlier simple elasticities like that can
be quite misleading as far as evaluating speciﬁc reforms. Moreover, reforms we are likely to consider in
practice, may aﬀect incomes at many parts of the budget constraint and there may be interactions ith other
welfare beneﬁts . In the next section we undertake a simple illustrative exercise and we use our model to
predict the impact of a couple of simple reforms to give an idea of what these results imply.
423.1.4 Simulating Reforms
The model we have estimated ignores the hours dimension, taking hours to be drawn randomly from the
observed distribution. In other ways however, the model is more sophisticated than many in the literature in
that it allows for the complete structure of the tax and welfare-beneﬁt system at the same time allowing for
the endogeneity of both hourly wages and post tax incomes. It achieves this by using the information from a
number of tax reforms over time and the diﬀerent way they have aﬀected diﬀerent types of individual, living
in diﬀerent parts of the country.
Within the context of this model simulating a tax reform implies changing the required parameters of
the tax and welfare-system and then computing how this will change the out-of-work and expected in-work
income of each individual and the resulting work probability. The purpose of this section is to illustrate what
a model such as this has to say about tax reform. It also emphasizes the fact that knowing the elasticity
alone is not suﬃcient to predict what the eﬀects will be. If anything, the reform will typically change the
in-work and out-of-work incomes of diﬀerent types of individuals in diﬀerent ways: making tax credits more
generous will aﬀect low wage individuals but not higher wage ones for instance.
The baseline British tax system which we will “reform” can be described as follows: there is a non-taxable
earnings allowance (£4745 at the time) beyond this (in 2004) there is a 10% a 22% and a 40% tax bracket.
In addition to these taxes individuals contribute to National Insurance, a tax which is justiﬁed as funding
pensions. The employees’ NI rate is 11% and declines to 1% beyond a particular level of earnings called
the Upper Earnings Limit (UEL). This means that eﬀectively the marginal tax rates were 21%, 33% and
41%, abstracting from employers national insurance. Both NI and income tax payments are assessed on
individual income and there are no deductions allowed for consumption or mortgages. In addition there are
a number of welfare beneﬁts, including housing beneﬁt and working tax credits which are assessed on the
basis of family income. In particular the Working Tax Credit (WTC) is a means-tested tax credit for those
working a qualifying number of hours per week, whilst the Child Tax Credit (CTC) provides means tested
support to families with incomes up to approximately £57,000. For more information on the UK tax and
beneﬁt system see Adam and Browne (2006), O’Dea, Phillips and Vink (2007), and the relevant chapter of
this publications.
To illustrate the implications of the estimates we will carry out a relatively sweeping reform where the
system described above will be replaced by a ﬂat tax. We consider two sets of tax parameters: one is
43Flat Tax Reform: Integrated Income Tax NI and Tax Credits
Flat-rate income tax of 31% (36.65% for married men) on all income exceeding increased
personal allowance. Removal of UEL on National Insurance
Contributions. Tax Credit not tapered away at additional rate.
Single Men Cohabiting Men
Overall 42% marginal tax rate Overall 47.65% marginal tax rate
Table 2: Probit Results for male participation - marginal eﬀects.
revenue neutral for single men and the other for married/cohabiting men. The employment behaviour of the
female partner is taken as ﬁxed here. Table 2 provides the details of the reform, while ﬁgures 7 and 8 show
graphically how the reform aﬀects single and married men.36
The ﬂat tax has distinctly diﬀerent impacts upon the net-income of the single man and the cohabiting
man (with one child); this is because of the diﬀering entitlements to tax credits which are fully integrated
and tapered away as part of standard income tax payments in this reformed system. The single man, eligible
only for working tax credit (when working at least 30 hours per week) faces a higher tax rate implying lower
net income at hours less than 30 as well as above 55 when the working tax credit has been ‘tapered away’.
For the married man, on the other hand, the new system involves higher transfer income in the form of the
more generous working tax credit for couples and the child tax credit. Below 35 hours, the marginal tax rate
is lower because tax credits are no longer being tapered away at their pre-reform 37% rate. Despite a 47.65%
marginal tax rate, ‘universal tax credits’ ensure that with a £10 hourly wage, income is considerably higher
in the reform system even at 70 hours per week. The reform is ﬁnanced by individuals with higher wages.
Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the impact of the reform on the budget constraint of a single and a cohabiting
man with one child respectively.
Overall the reform reduces the income of those not entitled to tax credits and increases the incomes of
those eligible, particularly those in couples with children. Table 3 shows the estimated eﬀect of the reform,
separately for single and cohabiting men. This uses the actual FRS data and consequently the results are
representative of the population and include all observed demographic groups with their frequencies as found
in the data. The results are broken down by quartile of wages.
The reform has a modest positive impact on the employment probability, with this being more notable for
men with partners. For single men the small positive employment eﬀects are observed for those with wages
36In these ﬁgures the man is assumed to earn £10 per hour the spouse (if there is one) works 20 hours at £6 per hour; their




























































Table 3: Probit Results for male participation - marginal eﬀects.
in the 2nd and third quartile. However, the reform predicts a substantial positive employment eﬀect for low
wage cohabiting men, with some small negative employment eﬀects for higher wage individuals. The reform
does not discourage participation for those paying for the reform basically because their work probability
is so high. So it looks as if this reform has the important advantage of encouraging work for the lowest
wage individuals but has little cost in terms of lost employment by those who pay for it. The conclusion
however may be misleading because our model is incomplete in at least two important dimensions. First,
we do not allow hours to change. Second, we do not allow non-hours|eﬀort to change. Finally, a reform
such as this is likely to have longer term eﬀects on investment in human capital as well as possible General
Equilibrium eﬀects. These would need to be evaluated carefully if such a reform is to be considered seriously.
Nevertheless, our aim was not so much to discuss the merits of such a reform, but to illustrate the implications
of our estimates for the sensitivity of participation to a major reform and to show what the magnitude of
the parameters would mean for a major change to the tax system.
4 Conclusions
The study of labour supply is key to understanding the welfare and revenue eﬀects of taxation. However,
there are many dimensions to labour supply and each seems to be most relevant for a diﬀerent group of
persons. We have thus considered hours of work per week and per year, labour force participation and total
taxable income. The picture that emerges is very interesting. Incentives matter and taxation can generate
important distortions.
Male hours of work are almost completely irresponsive to changes in work incentives; however male
46participation, particularly for those with low or medium levels of education can be very responsive: the
number of people working among the low skill can be very sensitive to the design of welfare beneﬁts and
tax credits as operated in the UK with an hours condition, for instance. Hours of work and labour force
participation for women with young children and particularly for lone mothers are also quite sensitive to tax
and beneﬁt incentives. Participation elasticities (work/non work) are positive and demonstrate quite a lot
of sensitivity to incentives for the decision to work or not. For highly educated individuals the sensitivity of
both hours of work and participation to work incentives are almost zero. However, for higher income and
higher skill individuals the total income elasticity is substantial, but probably less than one. Thus for low
skill men the structure of the beneﬁt system is likely to aﬀect their work probability. For high skill men
higher rates of taxes are likely to discourage eﬀort and creativity quite substantially to imply important
eﬃciency eﬀects of taxation.
In our chapter we have also tried to give a ﬂavour of the complexity of estimating the eﬀects of tax and
beneﬁt reforms, particularly when the system has elements of regressivity. The size of the elasticity is not
suﬃcient to give us a complete view of the labour supply eﬀects of tax and beneﬁt reforms. The magnitude
of the responses will also depend on the whole structure of the budget constraint. Non-convexities, such as
those induced by the tax credit system can induce large behavioural responses, even if the elasticities are
quite small. So a complete analysis of the eﬀort/hours responses of reforms requires simulation taking into
account the whole structure of the tax and transfer system.
Finally, it is important to remember that taxes and welfare beneﬁts aﬀect more than just work eﬀort.
They can change other decisions, including most importantly the decision to accumulate human capital. We
have presented some evidence that such a margin of adjustment may be important. However, this adjustment
is “hidden” because its impact is much longer term which likewise makes it more diﬃcult to estimate due to
the diﬃculties in disentangling the impact of tax reforms from secular trends. Genuine policy analysis has
to address the longer term issues, which could prove to be the most important for behavioural and welfare
eﬀects. A well designed tax and beneﬁt system will need to recognise that all groups in the population can
be quite sensitive to taxes and beneﬁts in many diﬀerent dimensions.
47Table A1: Married Female Labour Supply (Continuous Hours Elasticities) 
Study  Data / Sample  Variables Used  Labour Supply Model  Uncomp. Wage Elasticity  Income 
Elasticity 
Arellano & Meghir 
(1992) 
UK Family Expenditure Survey 
and Labour Force Survey 1983 
Age 20-59 married, 11535 
employed, 13200 non-employed.  
H: Weekly Hours 
Y: Consumption based 
other income measure 
W: marginal wage rate 
Semi-log labour supply with  
fixed costs and job search costs; 
Budget set assumed convex and 
piecewise linear; allows 
endogenous wages and 
unearned income using IV 
approach. 
0.29 to 0.71 
 
Depending on age of children 
and woman. At sample means: 
0.37 









Swedish Level of Living Survey 
1981: sample size 795, 640 
employed  
Age 25-55 married 
H: Annual Hours 
W: Wage, SS 
Y: Spouse’s net income 
plus benefits and capital 
income.  
Linear & Quadratic labour 
supply; Convex and Non-
Convex piece-wise linear 
budgets; some specifications 
control for taxes and benefits, 
others do not; predicted 
wages ,both Heckman 
corrected and full information 
maximum likelihood (FIML); 
fixed and random preferences. 
Evaluated at Means 
Heckman Fixed:  0.386 
FIML Fixed:  0.79 
Heckman, quadratic, Fixed:  
0.58 








Blundell, Duncan & 
Meghir (1998) 
UK Family Expenditure Survey 
1978 – 1992: sample size 16781 
employed 7845 non-employed, 
aged 20-50 married or 
cohabiting 
H: Usual Weekly Hours 
& Overtime 
W: after tax Usual Pay 
and overtime over H 
Y: non-durable weekly 
consumption minus 
earnings 
Semi-log linear labour supply; 
includes controls for children, 
education and cohort; accounts 
for taxes and benefits; grouping 
estimator (based on education 
and cohort) to overcome 
simultaneity.   
No  children: 0.14 
Youngest child 0-2: 0.21 
Youngest child 2-5: 0.37 
Youngest child 5-10: 0.13 









French Labour Force Survey 1985: 
sample size 1175 employed, 817 
non-employed aged 18-60 
married 
H: Normal Weekly 
Hours 
W: Hourly Net Wage & 
SS 
Y: Spouses net income 
& benefits. 
Linear labour supply; convex 
piecewise linear budget 
constraint; accounts for 
taxation but ignores non-
convexities induced by benefits; 
random preferences; can 
include fixed costs; exogenous 
wage.   
Tobit: 0.3 
Hausman-style: 1 
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Cogan (1981)  US National Longitudinal Study of 
Mature Women 1967: 
Married women aged 30-35. 898 
workers and 939 nonworkers. 
H: Annual Hours of 
work 
W: hourly wage 
Y: Husband’s Earnings. 
Semi-log Labour supply (linear 
in hours); wages predicted using 
selection correction; and labour 
supply subject to reservation 
hours to account for fixed 
costs; does not account for 
taxes or benefit payments. 
Elasticity at mean 1400 hours 
per year 
0.864 







Hausman (1981)  US Panel of Income Dynamics 
1975: sample size 575 participants, 
510 non-participants married 
H: Annual Hours of 
Work 
W: hourly wage, SS 
Y: Transfer and asset 
income evaluated at 8% 
return 
Linear Labour Supply. Convex 
(piece-wise linear) and Non-







Heckman (1974a)  National Longitudinal Survey of 
Work Experience 1967 for 
Women  2,100 white women - 
married spouse present. 
 
H: Annual Hours 
W: hourly wage 
Y: Husbands Earnings 
and non-labour income. 
Maximum likelihood estimation 
of wage and reservation wage 
function 
Non-separable male labour 
supply 
No taxes or benefits accounted 
for. 
Hours worked at 2000 hours 
per year 
0.8 









Heckman  (1974) 
US 1960 Census of Population. 
Married Women aged 25 – 54.  
H: Participations 
W: hourly wage 
Y: Unearned Income.  
Labour supply linear in 
differentials, proxying 
differentials by differences 
from mean values; exogenous 
wages; does not account for 
taxes or benefits; unitary family 
framework. 
Evaluated at Means: 
0.912 
(-0.075 cross elasticity) 
Imposing Unitary assumptions 
1.15 






Kaiser et al (1992)  German Socio-Economic Panel 
1983: sample size 1076 employed, 
2284 non-employed, non-retired 
married 
H: Annual Hours 
W: hourly wage, SS 
Y: income from rents, 
benefits and capital.  
Linear Labour Supply 
Convex piecewise linear budget 
set 
1.04 -0.18 
Mroz (1987)  US PSID 1976 
753 married white women 
between the ages of 30 and 
60 in 1975, with 428 working 
H: Annual Hours 
W: Hourly wage 
Y: non-wife household 
income 
Semilog linear labour supply. 
Sensitivity analysis using many 
different methods, including 
allowing for fixed costs and 
Max wage elasticity in 
acceptable model (at 1300 
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  endogenous wages and non-
labour income 
Triest (1990)  US Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics 1983 sample size: 715 
employed, 263 non-employed aged 
25 – 55 married 
H: Yearly Hours, all jobs 
W: average hourly wage, 
SS 
Y: Income from rents, 
dividends etc 
Linear Labour supply; 
Convex and piecewise linear 
budget set; accounts for taxes 
and benefits; uses actual wages 
and imputed wages separately; 





0.26 to 0.28 






H: Hours/Work Measure used, W: Wage Measure used, Y: Income measure used. SS Net wage includes social security deductions. Table A2: Female Labour Supply - Participation Elasticities 
Study  Data / Sample  Variables Used  Labour Supply Model  Uncomp. Wage Elasticity  Income Elasticity
Aaberge et al (1999)  Italian Survey of Household 
Income and Wealth 1987. Families 
aged 20 – 70, self employment 
income < 20% 
H: not given 
W: net wages 
Y: other income 
Family Labour supply, not 
subject to unitary restrictions; 
Non linear labour supply; non-
convex budget constraint; 
accounts for taxes and benefits; 
hours and supply constraints 
(demand /institutions); 
exogenous wages and unearned 
income.   
Mean of sample: 
0.654 
10th income percentile 
2.837 
11th – 89th percentiles 
0.742 










Arrufat & Zabalza 
(1986) 
UK: 1974 General Household 
Survey. 3495 married women aged 
less than 60 with husbands less 
than 65 
 
H: weekly Hours / 
Participation 
W: gross wages 
Y: adjusted unearned 
income plus husband. 
CES utility function  
convex budget constraint; 
optimisation errors and 
preference heterogeneity; 
accounts for taxes but not 
benefits. 
 





Blundell, Ham & 
Meghir (1987) 
UK FES Survey 1981. 2011 
married women.  1076 employed, 
935 zero hours. Aged 16 – 60 
married to men 16 – 65 
H: participation 
W: marginal net wages 
Y: Consumption-based 
other income 
Non-linear labour supply model 
with unemployment (relaxation 
of Tobit); accounts for both 
taxes and benefits; predicted 






Pencavel (1998)  US March CPS 
1975-94 
Sample selection: women aged 25 
– 60 
H: Participation 
W: hourly wage 
Y: Non labour income. 
Log-linear labour supply; 
controls for age and cohort 
(each cohort has own wage 
profile); education allowed to 
vary and indirect wage effect 
via education; does not account 
for taxes or benefits; wages 
treated as both exogenous and 
endogenous; not selection-
corrected.  
WLS, corrected for selection  
0.77 – 0.839 
IV – US trade balance and 
education, corrected for 
selection. 
0.791 – 0.892 




H: Hours/Work Measure used, W: Wage Measure used, Y: Income measure used. FES: UK Family Expenditure Survey. CPS: US Current Population Survey 
CES: Constant Elasticity of Substitution Table A3: Lone Mothers’ Labour Supply 
 
Study  Data / Sample  Variables Used  Labour Supply Model  Uncompensated. Wage Elasticity 
Blundell, Duncan & 
Meghir (1992) 
UK: Family Expenditure 
Survey 1981 – 1986: sample 
size 1654.  
Lone mothers 
 no self-employed 
H: Usual Weekly Hours 
W: Hourly Wage 
Y: Consumption Based 
Mmarginal rate of substitution function; 
accounts for taxation but not benefits; wages 
and income endogenous, and wages selection-
corrected.  
 
Basic rate taxpayers: 
0.16 
All lone mothers: 
0.34 
Excluding hours ‘bunches’ 
0.14 
Brewer, Duncan, 
Shephard & Suarez 
(2005) 
 
UK: Family Resources 
Survey 1995 – 2002. 13,458 
lone mothers aged<60, not 
self employed and not 
disabled.  
H: Usual Weekly Hours 
W: Hourly Wage 
Y: Net income evaluated at 
discrete hours.  
Discrete choice over 5 positive hours; fixed 
costs, heterogeneous tastes and joint choice 
over programme participation; accounts for 
taxes and benefits; endogenous childcare use.  




Dickert, Houser and 
Scholz (1995) 
USA SIPP 1990. Single 
women with children. 
Exclude those with high 
assets 
H: Participation 
W: Gross Hourly Wage 
Y: Net income evaluated at 
discrete hours 
Discrete choice over non-participation and 2 
positive hours points; taxes and benefits 
accounted for;  IV – return to work 
instrumented by whether state has high or low 
benefits.  
Participation Elasticity  
from EITC: 
0.85 
From returns to work: 
0.35 
 
Eissa & Liebman 
(1996) 
USA CPS 1985-87 and 1989-
91. Single women with 
children 
H: Participation 
W:  Hourly Wage 
Y: Net income evaluated at 
discrete hour 
No explicit structural  labour supply model. 
Difference in difference estimator comparing 
those with children and those without following 
US TRA86 reform 
Participation Elasticity: 
1.16 





UK: 1973 – 1982 General 
Household survey. 2062 lone 
mothers with 966 employed. 
H: Work or Not. 
W: Net Hourly Wage 
Y: Net income evaluated at 
different points 
Discrete choice of work and not-work; accounts 
for taxes and benefits in a simplified manner;  
includes fixed costs of work; predicted wages, 
Heckman selection-corrected; includes demand-
side controls (regional unemployment).  
Participation Elasticity: 
1.7 
Eligible for FIS:   1.8 
Ineligible for FIS: 1.2 
 





UK: 1989 Lone Parents 
Survey. 1235 lone mothers, 
with 519 in employment.  
H: Full or Part time 
W: Gross Hourly Wage 
Y: Net income evaluated in 
and out of work. 
Discrete choice over two positive hours points; 
double hurdle model (participation and 
employment);  includes fixed costs;  accounts 
for benefits but not taxes; predicted wages for 




Full-time work Elasticity: 
1.44 
 
(Both gross wages) 
Keane and Moffitt 
(1998) 
USA: 1994 SIPP. Single 
women with children. 
Exclude those with high 
assets 
H: Full or Part time 
W: Gross Hourly Wage 
Y: Net income evaluated in 
and out of work. 
Discrete choice over two positive hours points; 
Jointly model decision of labour supply and 
welfare programme participation; accounts for 
benefits but not taxes; predicted wages for non-
workers; identification off cross-state variation 







1.47 – 1.97 




Expenditure Survey with 
1729 lone mothers.  
W: Gross Hourly Wage 
Y: Net income evaluated in 
and out of work.  
for benefits; predicted wages used, not selection 
corrected.   
0.7 
(net income) 
FIS: Family Income Supplement, an early name for the UK in work benefit System  EITC: the US Earned Income Tax Credit. H: Hours/Work Measure used, W: Wage Measure 
used, Y: Income measure used. SIPP: US Survey of Income and Programme Participation, FES: UK Family Expenditure Survey, GHS: UK General Household Survey, PSID: 
US Panel Study of Income Dynamics. TRA86 the US tax reform of 1986 Table A4: Male Labour Supply (Continuous Hours Elasticities) 
Study  Data / Sample  Variables Used  Labour Supply Model  Uncomp. Wage Elasticity  Income Elasticity
Ashenfelter 
&Heckman  (1974) 
US 1960 Census of 
Population; married men 
aged 25 – 54. 
H: Annual Hours 
W: hourly wage 
Y: Unearned Income 
Labour supply linear in 
differentials, proxying 
differentials by differences 
from mean values; exogenous 
wages; does not account for 
taxes or benefits; unitary family 
framework. 





Blomquist & Newey 
(2002) 
Swedish Level of Living 
Survey 1973, 1980, 1990; 
married aged 20 – 60;  
2321 across 3 waves 
H: Annual Hours of Work 
Y: Other Income 
W: Calculated Hourly 
Wage 
Non-parametric labour supply; 
convex budget constraint with 
allowance for “small” non-
convexities; estimated non-
parametrically over the budget 











French Labour Force 
Survey 1985; all employed 
married aged 18-60; 
sample size is 1992. 
H: Normal Weekly Hours 
Y: Family Allowances 
W: hourly net wage 
Linear Labour Supply; Convex 
(Piecewise Linear) Budget 
Constraint; accounts for 
taxation but ignores non-
convexities induced by benefits; 
random preferences; can 
include fixed costs; exogenous 
wage.   




Flood & MaCurdy 
(1992) 
Swedish Household Market 
and Non-Market Survey 
1984 all employed, married 
men 25 – 65; sample of 492
H: Annual hours of work 
Y: Asset income & Benefit 
Income 
W: Calculated Hourly 
Wage 
Linear and semi logarithmic 
Convex (piecewise linear and 
differentiable); allows for 
benefits and taxation; uses 
calculated (actual) wage with no 
selection-correction.  
 
-0.25 to 0.21 
 






Kaiser et al. (1992)  German Socioeconomic 
Panel 1983, married, non-
retired; sample of 2382 
employed, 939 not. 
H: Annual hours of work 
Y: rents, capital income 
and transfer payments 
W: Calculated Hourly 
Wage 
Convex and non-convex 
(piecewise linear) 




MaCurdy, Green & 
Paarsch (1990) 
USA Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics 1975: 
sample size 1017, all 
employed, married aged 
25-55.  
H Annual hours of work 
Y: rent, interest, dividends, 
spouses income etc. 
W: Calculated Hourly 
Wage   
Linear labour supply; 
piecewise linear and 
differentiable budget set; non-
convex portions ‘convexified’; 




Evaluated at means: 





 Table A4: Male Labour Supply (Continuous Hours Elasticities) 
Pencavel (2002)  USA Current Population 
Survey 1968-1999. 
All employed Males. 
Sample size not given.  
H: Annual hours of work 
Y: Current Non-Wage 
Income (for standard 
uncomp. wage elasticity). 
W: Calculated Hourly 
Wage 
Log-linear labour supply; 
linear budget constraint; no 
explicit treatment of tax and 
benefit system; actual wages;  
includes controls for 
demographic characteristics; 
same IV approach as Pencavel 
(1998), table A1.  
 
Labour Supply Function 
(A) White: -0.14 Black: -0.12 
(B) White: 0.25 Black: 0.12 
 
First Differenced 
(A) White: -0.02 Black: -0.17 
(B) White: -0.18 Black: 0.10 
 
 














Study  Data / Sample  Variables Used  Labour Supply Model  Uncomp. Wage Elasticity  Income Elasticity
Aaberge et al (1999)  Italian Survey of 
Household Income and 
Wealth 1987. Families aged 
20 – 70, self employment 
income < 20% 
H: not given 
W: net wages 
Y: other income 
Family Labour supply, not 
subject to unitary restrictions; 
Non linear labour supply; non-
convex budget constraint; 
accounts for taxes and benefits; 
hours and supply constraints 
(demand /institutions); 
exogenous wages and unearned 
income.   
Mean: 
0.046 
10th income percentile 
0.053 
11th – 89th percentiles 
0.051 










H: Hours/Work Measure used, W: Wage Measure used, Y: Income measure used. Table A6: Intertemporal Labour Supply Elasticities (Male and Female) 
 
Study  Data / Sample  Variables Used  Labour Supply Model  Inter-temp (Frisch) Wage Elasticity 




Confederation Survey of 
Employment. 1970 – 
1987.  
All men  
W: Calculated Hourly Wage 
H: Quarterly Hours of Work 
(including over-time) 
Y: Not observed 
 
Log linear labour supply with 
first difference specification; 
life-cycle labour supply & 
within period; does not account 
for taxes or benefits;  
 
 
Evaluated at means: 
0.14 
Altonji (1986)  USA PSID 1968 – 1981. 
Married Men aged no 
less than 25 in 1968 or 
older than 60 in 1979. 
W: Hourly wage profile 
H: Annual Hours of work 
Y: assets instrumented by 
consumption. 
Double log Frisch labour 
supply function 
Varies by estimation approach 
0.00 - 0.35 
 
Blundell, Meghir & 
Neves (1993) 
Pseudo-panel 
constructed from UK 
FES 1970-1984. 
Married women 
W: Hourly Wage 
H: Weekly Hours 
 
Flexible specification of 
preferences  
allowing for corner solutions 
and uncertainty; fixed costs. 
Marginal after tax wages 
No Children 
0.58 
With Children  
0.80 – 1.22 
Domeij & Floden 
(2006) 
USA PSID male 
household heads with 
sample based on 1984 
1989 & 1994. 
W: Hourly wage (calculated for 
salaried workers) 
H: Annual Hours 
Y: Asset Stocks (focus on total but 
suggests liquid may be more 
appropriate) 
Borrowing Constraints; Log-
linearization of the Euler 
Equation; includes 
specifications with separable 
and non-separable utility; does 
not account for taxes.  
Full Sample  
0.16 
Liquid Assets > X  
0.33 – 0.49 
Total Assets > X 
0.19 – 0.49 
Exclude Borrowing Constrained 
 0.55 
French (2004)  USA PSID & Validation 
data. 
Males, head of 
households.  1980 – 86.
W: Hourly Wage (as reported) and 
employer provided ‘true hours’ 
H: Annual Hours – same as above. 
Log linear Frisch  labour 
supply; does not account for 
taxes or benefits; wages 
exogenous; IV approach that 
controls for non-classical 
measurement error 
Controlling for measurement error 
-0.03 - 0.16 
(insignificant) 
French (2005)  USA PSID between 
1968 and 1997 
W: Hourly Wage 
H: Annual Hours  and Participation 
Y: Asset Profile 
Accounts for key aspects of the 
US tax code and for private and 
state pension entitlements;  
wages selection corrected; 
Considers tied wage hours 
packages 
Age 40: 
Standard model: 0.37 
Wage/hours packages: 0.19 
 
Age 60: 
Standard Model: 1.33 Table A6: Intertemporal Labour Supply Elasticities (Male and Female) 
 
Wage/hours packages: 1.04 
Heckman & MaCurdy 
(1980,83) 
USA PSID 1968-1975 
Continuously married 
women aged 30-65. 
White. 672 
W: Hourly wage profile 
H: Annual Hours and Participation 
Y: asset profile 
Log-linear Frisch labour supply 
model allowing for corner 
solutions; 
Linear budget constraint; does 
not account for taxes or 
benefits;   
Evaluated at means: 
1.8 
Imai & Keane (2004)  USA NLSLME 1979 – 
95. White Men aged 
20+ with 6 yrs of 
continuous data, no 
periods of 
unemployment. 
W: Hourly wage 
H: Annual Hours 
Y: asset stock 
Dynamic structural model with 
past hours of work affecting 
current wages through human 
capital accumulation. All 
persistence is attributed to state 
dependence.  
Evaluated at means: 
3.82 
Allowing for incentives through human 
capital accumulation 
Age range 20-60 
0.8-3 
Lee (2001)  USA PSID 
1967-76 balanced 
All men 5787 
1967-90 unbalanced 
All men 29405 
W: Hourly Wage (calculated for 
salaried workers) 
H: Annual Hours 
 
Log-linear labour supply, first 
differenced; correction for 
finite sample bias; actual wages; 




Evaluated at means: 
0.50 
 
MaCurdy (1981)  PSID prime age, white, 
married men 
1967-76. 
Age 25-46 years 
in 1967 
 
W: average annual earnings 
H: Annual Hours 
Double log Frisch labour 
supply (CES utility function). 
IV on wage using family 






Pistaferri (2003)  panel section of the 
Bank of Italy SHIW 
1989–93 
Married men, age 26-59
W: Hourly wage 
H: Weekly hours 
Log-linearised Euler equation 
Uses after tax marginal wages 
Decomposes changes in wages 
to anticipated and unanticipated 
components based on 
subjective expectations. 
Intertemporal Frisch elasticity 
0.70 
Unanticipated wage change 
0.51 
H: Hours/Work Measure used, W: Wage Measure used, Y: Income measure used. FES: UK Family Expenditure Survey, PSID: US Panel Study of Income Dynamics. 












Controls for Income 










Sections 1980 – 1984 




NBER Tax Panel 
1985 & 1988 
TRA 86  Married, non-aged non-S 
corp 
Income > $30k 
None AGI 
Taxable Income 
0.75 – 1.3 
1.1 (‘lower income’) to 
3.05 (‘higher income’) 
Navratil 
(1995) 
NBER Tax Panel 
1980 & 1983 
ERTA 81  Married 
Income > $25k 




IRS published data 
1992 & 1993 
OBRA 93  High Income  None  Taxable Income  1 
Auten-Caroll 
(1997) 
Treasury Tax Panel  
1985 & 1989 
TRA 86  Age 25-55, non-S corp.  
Income> $15k 









Treasury Tax Panel  
1985 to 1994 




Panel of Corp. Exec 
1991 to 1994 
OBRA 93  Corporate Execs 
95% Income> $150k 
Average Income  Wages, Bonuses & 
Stock Options 
Short Run: 1 
Long Run: 0.1 – 0.33 
Caroll  
(1998) 
Treasury Tax Panel  
1985 & 1989 
OBRA 93  Married aged 25-55 
Income > $50k 
Average Income  Taxable Income  0.5 
Goolsbee et al 
(1999) 
Tax Statistics (agg) 
1922 – 1989 
Various 
Reforms 




NBER Tax Panel 
1985 & 1988 
Fiscal Drag  Married & Singles  Include Log Income and 









1983 & 1989 
TRA 86  Oversampling of High 
Incomes 
Use Various Sets of 
Instruments 
AGI 2   




NBER Tax Panel 
1979 to 1990 
ERTA 81 & 
TRA 86 
Same marital status in 
paired-years 
Include Log Income, trend 





0.57 (high income) 






1986 to 1989 
Canadian 
TRA 88 
Federal Tax paid > $625 
(Can)  
Aged 25 – 64 
65+ 
Include log income in base 















NBER Tax Panel 
1978 to 1983 
Fiscal Drag  Married & Singles  Include Log Income and 









University of Michigan Tax 
Panel 
1979 to 1990 
ERTA 81 & 
TRA 86 
Same marital status in 
paid-years. Other criteria
Include current income, non-
linear controls for income 
Taxable Income  0.2 – 0.57 
Eissa & Giertz 
(2006) 
Treasury Tax Panel 
1992 – 2003 
 & Execucomp 




Executives of S&P 500 
companies and top 1% 
of Tax Panel.  
Includes current and future 
after-tax rates. No controls 
for mean reversion etc.  
Earned Income AGI 
 
1993: Long Run (SR) 





ERTA 81: Economic Recovery Tax Act (1981), TRA 86: Tax Reform Act (1986), OBRA 93 Omnibus Reconciliation Act (1993), TRA 97: Taxpayer Relief Act (1997), 
EGTRRA: Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (2001). (A)GI: (Adjusted) Gross Income. NBER: National Bureau of Economic Research. IRS: Internal 
Revenue Service. 
  5 Appendix 1: Some technical terms explained
• Budget set: in this context, a relationship between hours worked and the amount of income this
provides.
• Utility function: a utility function is the economists’ way of representing individual preferences
over diﬀerent goods; for given quantities of each good a utility function implies a rate that the individual is
willing to trade one good for another (consumption for leisure in our case) — the marginal rate of substitution.
Individuals choose a point on their budget set so as to maximise their utility. The size of the marginal rate
of substitution is directly related to the impact of incentives on the supply of eﬀort,
• Marginal tax rate: the tax rate that would be paid on a small additional amount of income (i.e. at
the margin). This may be higher or lower than the average tax rate which is the amount of tax paid at a
given income divided by that income.
• Income and substitution eﬀects: suppose the tax rate is increased. The income eﬀect is the eﬀect of
the reduction in net income implied by higher taxes. It implies one would work more because one is poorer.
The substitution eﬀect, on the other hand, causes one to work less because the trade of between work and
leisure (i.e. the net wage) has been made less favourable. In this case, the two eﬀects work in opposite
directions but this is not always so.
• Elasticity: this is the “proportional change in X, given a ‘1 unit’ change in Y”. In this context, the
labour supply elasticity with respect to the wage is the “proportional change in labour supply, given a ‘1
unit’ increase in the (net hourly) wage rate”. An elasticity of 1 means labour supply increases by 1% for a
1% rise in the net wage; an elasticity of 0.1 means a 0.1% rise for a 1% increase in the net wage. The size
of the elasticity is determined by the income and substitution eﬀects detailed above.
Further concepts and terms will be deﬁned in the relevant sections of the chapter.
6 Appendix 2: The Diﬀerence in Diﬀerences Estimator and the
taxable income elasticity
In this appendix we look in some detail at the diﬀerence in diﬀerences estimator that has been used to
estimate the impact of reducing higher marginal tax rates. When we refer to the treatment group we refer to
individuals who beneﬁt from a tax reduction (or more generally change). The control group is the group to
whom these are compared. Speciﬁcally what is frequently estimated is some version of the following double
48log speciﬁcation
logEis = α0 + β logps + β log(1 − tis)+uis
where Eis stands for earnings for individual i in period s, pt is the unit price of eﬀort in period s, and tis is
the tax rate faced by the individual. 37 The last term uis is unobserved and constitutes the random income
shock. The nature of this shock plays an important role in our attempts to understand incentive eﬀects. In
this simpliﬁed framework, the eﬀect we wish to estimate is β,namely the proportionate eﬀect on earnings (or
taxable income in other contexts) of a percentage change in the proportion of earnings retained after tax.38
The approach to estimating β followed in the literature39, is to compare the growth of earnings for a group
that was subject to a tax reform (say the very high earners) to a group with earnings just below the level
at which the tax cut took eﬀect. This approach ignores the fact we do not observe the price of eﬀort p and
treats it as a common factor aﬀecting every group in the same way; hence it drops out when we compare
across groups of individuals.
To see how this works, suppose we have two populations operating in the same labour market, but one
consisting of individuals who earn less initially so that they face lower tax rates than the members of the
other group. Suppose a policy reform is introduced whereby the tax rate of the higher earners is reduced.
The lower-earnings group with incomes not targeted by the reform will constitute the control group. It
is assumed that we observe the same set of individuals before and after the reform; the classiﬁcation in
treatment (those aﬀected by the reform) and control group (those not aﬀected) is based on their original
income. We ignore observed unearned income, which in practice we can control for. The diﬀerence in these
two groups will be reﬂected in diﬀerences in the mean of u in the pre-reform period (i.e. the mean of ui0);
the method indeed needs to assume that this mean aﬀects outcomes in both periods in exactly the same
way. In technical jargon this means that any changes in income are permanent. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
estimator for the eﬀect of the tax reduction is based upon the diﬀerence in the change (∆)i nl o ge a r n i n g s
in the treatment group (logE1) from that of the control group i.e. ∆logE1 − ∆logE0.T h i si st h e ns c a l e d
by the percentage change in the proportion of earnings taken home (1−t), or more accurately the change in
log(1−t). This calculation aims at obtaining an estimate of β. However there are three important diﬃculties
with the interpretation of the results: a. income shocks are unlikely to be permanent; b. the price of eﬀort
may change diﬀerently for each of the groups and c. aggregate economic trends may diﬀer across lower and
37Notice that by the properties of logs the log of the after tax price of eﬀort is log((1 − t)p)=l o gp +l o g( 1− t).
38Note that this is not the same as (minus) the elasticity of earnings with respect to the tax rate. The latter is -β t
1−t.
39see Feldstein (1995, 1999) for example.
49higher earning individuals. The approach described has to assume all these issues away. The expression
below summarises the problems by including three diﬀerent confounding components. To do this in a simple
w a yw eh a v ee x p r e s s e dt h ew a yt h ei n c o m es h o c k sp e r s i s tf r o mo n ep e r i o dt ot h en e x ta sui1 = ρui0 + εi1.
This means that in period 1 (after the reform) a proportion ρ of the income shock that occurred in period
0 continues to aﬀect the observed level of income. The approach assumes that this proportion is 1, i.e. that
the shock is permanent. Suppose there is a tax reform and call D the percentage change in the proportion of
earnings that the person in the High group can keep minus the same for the Low income group.40 Formally,
D = ∆log(1 − t)H − ∆log(1 − t)L.Thus what the method really estimates is
∆logEH − ∆logEL
D












where a superscript H denotes those with a higher income in the ﬁrst period and L those with a lower
one. uH
0 is the average ﬁrst period random income “shock” for those classiﬁed as high income in the ﬁrst
period (the treatment group) and similarly uH
0 for the low income individuals. So for example ∆logEH is
the earnings growth of those classiﬁed as “high income” in the pre-reform period. In what follows we will
suppose that the reform reduced the tax rate faced by the higher income individuals relative to the low
income individuals; thus D>0.
The ﬁrst term in 2 reﬂects mean reversion of incomes. Unless all shocks are permanent (ρ =1 )we
expect this term to be negative and will bias downward the eﬀect β we are seeking to estimate. This is
the bias caused by mean reversion and is discussed at length by Gruber and Saez (2000).41 The second
term reﬂects the aggregate growth rate of individuals in diﬀerent parts of the initial income distribution.
So during periods of increasing inequality, such as the 80s in the US and the UK this term will be positive;
this means that the incomes of those higher up in the distribution are growing faster than those lower down
for reasons that may not be related to the tax reform directly and this will bias upwards the eﬀect we wish
to estimate. The ﬁnal term has to do with whether individuals at a lower part of the income distribution
oﬀer a diﬀerent type of skill to those at a higher part. In the extreme, all these individuals just oﬀer the
same type of skill, more or less eﬀectively, and then the adjustment ∆log
p1
p0 will be zero because the price
for a unit of eﬀort across the two groups grows in the same way. However, under reasonable assumptions
∆log
p1
p0 will be negative when the tax rate relating to the higher earning individuals is cut42 This can occur
40The High and Low categories are deﬁned by the income position before the reform took place.
41Note that Feldstein categorises people on the basis of the pre-reform marginal tx rate. This is a function of the pre-reform
income. Hence although more complicated this is in eﬀect a categorisation by initial income and the same arguments apply.
42To show this we have taken a CES production function with two types of labour. The labour supply elasticities of the two
50because the decrease in tax for the higher income group will increase their supply of labour and will lead to
a shift in the demand for labour from the lower skill to the higher skill group. In equilibrium one can show
that ∆log
p1
p0 is then negative. The result is a downward bias for the estimated earnings elasticity. Thus
accounting for such general equilibrium eﬀects would lead to larger elasticities (β) than those implied by the
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences framework. The approach we described above is thus fraught with problems: mean
reversion in income and general equilibrium eﬀects bias downward the elasticity, while aggregate trends can
go either way. For the speciﬁcc a s eo ft h er e f o r m sa n a l y s e di nt h eU S( t h e1 9 8 6r e f o r mi np a r t i c u l a r )t h e
increase in inequality would bias the elasticity upwards.
7 References
Aaberge, R., Colombino, U. & Strom, S. (1999), “Labour Supply in Italy: An Empirical Analysis of Joint
Household Decisions, with Taxes and Quantity Constraints”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, Vol. 14, No.
4, pp. 403 — 422
A d a m ,S .&B r o w n e ,J ." AS u r v e yo ft h eU KT a xS y s t e m " ,I n s t i t u t ef o rF i s c a lS t u d i e s( 2 0 0 6 )
Ackum-Agell, S. & Meghir , C. (1995), “Male Labour Supply in Sweden: Are Incentives Important”,
Swedish Economic Policy Review
Adda, J., Dustmann, C., Meghir, C & Robin, J-M. (2006), "Career Progression and Formal versus
On-the-Job Training", IZA working Paper.
Altonji, J. G. (1986), “Intertemporal Substitution in Labour Supply: Evidence from Micro Data”, The
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, No. 3, Part 2, pp. S176 — S215
Arellano, M. & Meghir, C. (1992), “Female Labour Supply and On-the-Job Search: An Empirical Model
Estimated Using Complimentary Datasets”, The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 59, No. 3, pp. 537 — 559
Arrufat, J. L. & Zabalza, A. (1986), “Female Labour Supply with Taxation, Random Preferences and
Optimization Errors”, Econometrica, Vol. 54, No. 1, pp. 47 — 63
Ashenfelter, O. & Heckman (1974), “The Estimation of Income and Substitution Eﬀects in a model of
Family Labor Supply”, Econometrica, Vol. 42, No. 1, pp 73 - 85
A u t e n ,G .&C a r r o l l ,R .( 1 9 9 9 ) ,“ T h eE ﬀect of Taxes on Household Income”, The Review of Economics
and Statistics”, Vol. 81, No. 5, pp. 681 — 693
Blomquist, S. & Hansson-Brusewitz, U. (1990), “The Eﬀect of Taxes and Male And Female Labor Supply
groups can diﬀer.
51in Sweden”, The Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 317 - 357
Blomquist, S. & Newey, W. (2002), “Nonparametric Estimation with Nonlinear Budget Constraints”,
Econometrica, Vol. 70, No. 6, pp. 2455 - 2480
Blow, L. and I. Preston (2002) “Deadweight Loss and Taxation of Earned Income: Evidence from Tax
Records of the UK Self Employed” Institute for Fiscal Studies Working Paper WP02/15
Blundell, R., Chiappori, P., Magnac, T. & Meghir, C. (2007), “Collective Labour Supply: Heterogeneity
and Nonparticipation”, Review of Economic Studies (2007) 74, 417—445
Blundell, R., Chiappori, P. & Meghir, C. (2004), “Collective Labour Supply with Children”, IFS Working
Paper, WP02/08
Blundell, R., Duncan, A. & Meghir, C. (1992), “Taxation in Empirical Labour Supply Models: Lone
Mothers in the UK”, The Economic Journal, Vol. 102, No. 411, pp. 265 - 278
Blundell, R., Duncan, A. & Meghir, C. (1998), “Estimating Labor Supply Responses Using Tax Reforms”,
Econometrica, Vol. 66, No. 4, pp. 827 - 861
Blundell, R., Ham, J. & Meghir, C. (1987), “Unemployment and Female Labour Supply”, The Economic
Journal, Vol. 97, supplement, pp. 44 - 64
Blundell, R., MaCurdy, T. (1999), "Labor Supply: A Review of Alternative Approaches," in Handbook
of Labor Economics, Vol. 3A. Ashenfelter and Card eds.
Blundell, R., MaCurdy, T. & Meghir, C. (2007), “Labor Supply Models: Unobserved Heterogeneity,
Nonparticipation and Dynamics”, forthcoming Handbook of Econometrics, Heckman and Leamer eds.
Blundell, R., Meghir, C. & Neves, P. (1993), “Labour Supply and Intertemporal Substitution”, Journal
of Econometrics, Vol. 53, No. 1, pp. 137 - 160
Blundell, R., Meghir, C., Symons, E. & Walker, I. (1998), "Labour supply speciﬁcation and the evaluation
of tax reforms", Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 36 (1) pp. 23 - 52.
Blundell, R., Reed, H. & Stoker, T. (2003), “Interpreting Aggregate Wage Growth: The Role of Labor
Market Participation”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 93, No. 4, pp. 1114 — 1131
Blundell, R. & Walker, I. (1986), “A Life Cycle Consistent Empirical Model of Family Labour Supply
Using Cross Section Data”, The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 53, No. 4, pp. 539 — 558.
Bourguignon, F. & Magnac, T. (1990), “Labor Supply and Taxation in France”, The Journal of Human
Resources, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 358 - 389
Brewer, M. & Browne, J. (2006), “The Eﬀect of the Working Families’ Tax Credit on Labour Market
52Participation”, IFS Brieﬁng Notes, No. 69
Brewer, M., Duncan, A., Shephard, A. & Suarez, M. (2005) "Did Working Families’ Tax Credit work?
The ﬁnal evaluation of the impact of in-work support on parents’ labour supply and take-up behaviour in
the UK", IFS report for HMRC.
Browning, M., Bourguignon, F., Chiappori, P.-A. and Lechene, V. (1996), “Incomes and Outcomes:
AStructural Model and Some Evidence from French Data”, Journal of Political Economy, 102, 1067—1096.
Burtless, G. & Hausman, J. (1978), “The Eﬀect of Taxation on Labor Supply: Evaluating the Gary
Negative Income Tax Experiment”, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 86, No. 6, pp. 1103 — 1130
Chiappori, P.-A. (1988), “Rational Household Labor Supply”, Econometrica, 56, 63—89.
Chiappori, P.-A. (1992), “Collective Labor Supply and Welfare”, Journal of Political Economy, 100,
437—467.
Cogan, J. (1981), “Fixed Costs and Labor Supply”, Econometrica, Vol. 49, No. 4, pp. 945 — 963
Devereux, J. (2004), “Changes in Relative Wages and Family Labor Supply”, Journal of Human Re-
sources, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 696 — 722
Dickert, S., Houser, S. & Scholz, J. (1995) "“The earned income tax credit and transfer programs: a
study of labor market and program participation”, in Tax Policy and the Economy, NBER and MIT Press,
Poterba, J (ed)
Domeij, D. & Floden, M. (2006), “The labor-supply elasticity and borrowing constraints: Why estimates
are biased”, The Review of Economic Dynamic, Vol. 9, pp 242 - 262
Donni, O. (2003), "Collective household labor supply: nonparticipation and income taxation", Journal
of Public Economics, Vol. 87 (5), pp. 1179 - 1198
Donni, O. (2007), "Collective female labour supply: theory and application", The Economic Journal,
Vol.117, pp 94 - 119.
Eckstein, Z. & Wolpin, K. (1989), “Dynamic Labour Force Participation of Married Women and Endoge-
nous Work Experience”, The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 56, No. 3
Eissa, N. & Giertz, S. (2006), “Trends in High Incomes and Behavioural Responses to Taxation: Evidence
from Executive Compensation and Statistics of Income Data”, Congressional Budget Oﬃce Working Papers,
No. 2006-14
Eissa, N. & Liebman, J. (1996), "Labor Supply Response to the Earned Income Tax Credit", The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 111 (2), pp. 605 - 637.
53Ermisch, J & Wright, R. (1991), "Welfare Beneﬁts and Lone Parents’ Employment in Great Britain",
The Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 26 (3) pp 424 - 456.
Feldstein, M. (1995), “The Eﬀects of Marginal Tax Rates on Taxable Income: A Panel Study of the 1986
Tax Reform Act”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 103, No. 3, pp. 551 — 572
Feldstein, M. & Feenberg, D. (1995), “The Eﬀects of Increased Tax Rates on Taxable Income and
Economic Eﬃciency: A Preliminary Analysis of the 1993 Tax Rate Increases”, NBER Working Paper Series,
No. W5370
Flood, L. & MaCurdy, T (1992), “Work disincentive eﬀects of taxes: an empirical study of Swedish men”,
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy
French, E. (2004), “The Labor Supply Response to (Mismeasured but) Predictable Wage Changes”, The
Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 86, No. 2, pp. 602 - 613
French, E. (2005), “The Eﬀects of Health, Wealth, and Wages on Labour Supply and Retirement Behav-
iour”, Review of Economic Studies (2005) 72, 395—427
Goolsbee, Austan (1999) “Evidence on the High-Income Laﬀer Curve from Six Decades of Tax Reform”
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity Vol. 1999, No. 2 (1999), pp. 1-64
Goolsbee, A. (2000), “What Happens when you Tax the Rich? Evidence from Executive Compensation”,
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 108, No. 2, pp. 352 — 378
Gorman, W. (1959), "Separable Utility and Aggregation", Econometrica, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 469 - 481
Gruber, J. & Saez, E. (2000), “The Elasticity of Taxable Income: Evidence and Implications”, NBER
Working Paper Series, No. 7512
Hausman , J. (1981), “Labour Supply: How Taxes aﬀect Economic Behaviour”, Tax and the Economy,
The Brookings. Institution.
Hausman Jerry A. (1985) "The Econometrics of Nonlinear Budget Sets” Econometrica Vol. 53, No. 6
(Nov., 1985), pp. 1255-1282
Heckman, J. (1974), “Eﬀects of Childcare Programs on Women’s Work Eﬀort”, The Journal of Political
Economy, Vol. 82, No. 2, Part 2, pp. S136 — S163
Heckman, J. (1974a), “Shadow Prices, Market Wages and Labor Supply”, Econometrica, Vol. 42, No. 4,
pp. 679 - 694
Heckman, J. & MaCurdy, T. (1980), “A Lifecycle Model of Female Labor Supply”, The Review of
Economic Studies, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 47 — 74
54Heckman, J. & MaCurdy, T. (1983) “Corrigendum on A Life Cycle Model of Female Labour Supply”
The Review of Economic Studies Vol. 49, No. 4 (Oct., 1982), pp. 659-660
Hill, S. (1982), “Estimating the Relationship Between Unemployment Compensation and Duration of
Unemployment: The problem of Non-Filers”, The Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 460 —
470
Hotz V. Joseph, Finn E. Kydland; Guilherme L. Sedlacek (1988) “Intertemporal Preferences and Labor
Supply” Econometrica Vol. 56, No. 2 (Mar., 1988), pp. 335-360
Imai, S. & Keane, M. (2004), “Intertemporal Labor Supply and Human Capital Accumulation”, Inter-
national Economic Review, Vol. 45, No. 2, pp. 601 - 641
Jenkins, S. (1992), "Lone Mothers’ Employment and Full Time Work Probabilities", The Economic
Journal, Vol. 102, No. 411, pp. 310 - 320.
Kaiser, H,.Spahn, P. & van Essen U. (1992), "Income taxation and the supply of labour in West Ger-
many", Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik
K e a n e ,M .&M o ﬃtt, R. (1998), “A Structural Model Multiple Welfare Participation and Labor Supply”,
International Economic Review, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 553 — 589
Keane, M, Wolpin, K. (1997), "The Career Decisions of Young Men", Journal of Political Economy, Vol.
105, No. 3, pp. 473 - 522
Kopczuk, W. (2005), “Tax Bases, Tax Rates and the Elasticity of Taxable Income”, The Journal of
Public Economics, Vol. 89, No, 11-12, pp. pp 2093 - 2119
Lee Chul-In (2001), “Finite Sample Bias in IV Estimation of Intertemporal Labor Supply Models: Is the
Intertemporal Substitution Elasticity Really Small?”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 83, No.
4, pp. 638 — 646
Lise, J. & Seitz, S. (2007), "Consumption Inequality and Intra-household Allocations", IFS Working
Papers, W09/07, Institute for Fiscal Studies
Lindsey, L. (1987), “Individual Taxpayer Response to Tax Cuts: 1982-1984, with Implications for the
Revenue Maximizing Tax Rate", Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 33, pp. 173 - 206
MaCurdy, T. (1981), “An Empirical Model of Labor Supply in a Life-Cycle Setting”, The Journal of
Political Economy, Vol. 89, No. 6, pp. 1059 — 1085
MaCurdy, T. (1983), “A Simple Scheme for Estimating an Intertemporal Model of Labor Supply and
Consumption in the Presence of Taxes and Uncertainty”, International Economic Review, Vol. 24, No. 2,
55pp. 265 — 289
MaCurdy, T., Green, D. & Paarsch, H. (1990), “Assessing Empirical Approaches for Analyzing Taxes
and Labor Supply”, The Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp 415 — 490
Meade, James (1978) The structure and reform of direct taxation. Report of a committee chaired by
Professor J.E. Meade, ISBN: 978-0-04-336064-4 January 1978 (Allen and Unwin)
Meyer, Bruce and D. Dan T. Rosenbaum (2001) “Welfare, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and the
Labor Supply of Single Mothers” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 116, No. 3. (Aug., 2001), pp.
1063-1114.
Moﬃt, R. (1984), “The Estimation of a Joint Wage-Hours Labor Supply Model”, Journal of Labor
Economics, Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 550 — 566
Moﬃtt, R. (1984), “Proﬁles of Fertility, Labor Supply and Wages of Married Women: A Complete Life
Cycle Model”, The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 51, No. 2, pp. 263 — 278
Moﬃtt, R. & Wilhelm, M. (2000), “Taxation and the Labor Supply Decisions of the Aﬄuent” in Does
Atlas Shrug? The Economic Consequences of Taxing the Rich, ed. J. Slemrod, Cambridge University Press
Mroz, T. (1987), “The Sensitivity of an Empirical Model of Married Women’s Hours of Work to Economic
and Statistical Assumptions”, Econometrica, Vol. 55, No. 4, pp. 765 — 799
Navratil, J. (1995), “The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981: Evidence on Individual Taxpayer Behavior
from Panel Tax Return Data”, Unpublished Harvard Thesis (see Gruber & Saez)
Nickell, S. (1979), “The Eﬀect of Unemployment and Related Beneﬁts on the Duration of Unemployment”,
The Economic Journal, Vol. 89, No. 353, pp. 34 — 49
O’Dea, C., Phillips, D. & Vink, A. (2007), "A Survey of the UK Beneﬁt System", Institute for Fiscal
Studies
Pencavel, J. (1998), “The Market Work Behaviour and Wages of Women: 1975-94”, The Journal of
Human Resources, Vol. 33. No. 4, pp. 771 — 804
Pencavel, J. (2002), “A Cohort Analysis of the Association between Work Hours and Wages among Men”,
The Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp 251 — 274
Pistaferri, Luigi (2003) “Anticipated and Unanticipated Wage Changes, Wage Risk, and Intertemporal
Labor Supply”, Journal of Labor Economics, 2003, vol. 21, no. 3
Sammartino, F. & Weiner, D. (1997), “Recent Evidence on Taxpayers’ Response to the Rate Increases
in the 1990’s", National Tax Journal, Vol. 50, No. 3, pp. 683-705
56Saez, E. (1999), "The Eﬀect of Marginal Tax Rates on Income: A Panel Study of ’Bracket Creep’",
NBER Working Paper 7367
Saez, E. (2003), "The eﬀect of marginal tax rates on income: a panel study of ’bracket creep’", Journal
of Public Economics, Vol. 85, pp. 1231 - 1258
Silaama, M. & Veall, M. (2000), “The Eﬀect of Marginal Tax Rates on Taxable Income: A Panel Study
of the 1988 Tax Flattening in Canada”, QSEP Research Report, No. 354
Thomas, D. (1990), “Intra-Household Resource Allocation: An Inferential Approach”, Journal of Human
Resources, 25, 635—664.
Triest, R. (1990), "The Eﬀect of Income Taxation on Labor Supply in the United States", The Journal
of Human Resources, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Special Issue), pp. 491 - 516
Walker, I. (1990), "The Eﬀect of Income Support Measures on the Labour Market Behaviour of Lone
Mothers", Fiscal Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 55 - 74
Ziliak, J. & Kniesner, T. (1999), “Estimating Life Cycle Labor Supply Tax Eﬀects”, The Journal of
Political Economy, Vol. 107, No. 2, pp. 326 — 359
57